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1. Introduction
Rooted in the seminal work of Samuelson (1938), the weak (generalized) axiom
of revealed preference–WGARP–has been seen as a minimal, normatively appealing,
and potentially empirically robust consistency condition of choice. However, a general
rationalization of WGARP remains unknown. Our paper fills this important gap in the
literature. The axiom is built on the direct preference relation: bundle xt is (strictly)
directly revealed preferred to bundle xs if a consumer chooses xt whenever xs is (strictly)
affordable (at prices pt ), i.e., if it holds that pt (xt − xs ) ≥ (>)0. WGARP states that
there is no pair, xt and xs , such that xt is directly revealed preferred to xs , while at the
same time xs is strictly and directly revealed preferred to xt .1
Standard utility maximization is characterized by the generalized axiom of revealed
preference–GARP–(Afriat’s theorem, Afriat 1967), which, in addition to being consistent
with WGARP, requires transitivity of preferences. There is abundant experimental and
field evidence against transitivity (Tversky 1969; Quah 2006). Our paper’s second motivation is exploring a general consumer theory that, while accepting consistent binary choices,
drops transitivity. In this endeavor, previous work does not provide a rationalization of
WGARP without imposing additional restrictions. Indeed, the existing literature has
mainly been focused on demand functions with infinite data and not demand correspondences with arbitrary (i.e., finite or infinite) data. For instance, the influential work
of Kihlstrom et al. (1976)–henceforth KMS–, which essentially proposes to rewrite the
entire theory of demand functions based on WGARP alone, falls short of providing a
rationalization. The KMS paper (p.977) conjectures that WGARP can be rationalized by
the model of consumer behavior in Shafer (1974). Shafer’s model describes a nontransitive
consumer who nevertheless satisfies WGARP. We discuss the conjecture in KMS and show
its difficulties in finite data sets (because of the possibility of nonconvex preferences);
see Subsection 3.2. More recently, Quah (2006) and Kim and Richter (1986) provide
rationalizations of WGARP but rely on additional restrictions, such as a form of convexity
in preferences and infinite data. Such convexity assumptions limit the scope of the results
and their empirical interest. Our results, in contrast, do not impose convexity, are extended
to general abstract choice setups, and can be used in both finite and infinite data.
1

Samuelson (1938) focuses on demand functions, and studies the weak axiom of revealed preference
(WARP–there is no pair of distinct observations such that xt is directly revealed preferred to xs , and at
the same time xs is directly revealed preferred to xt ), a special case of WGARP. Varian (1982) points
out that it is empirically more convenient to work with demand correspondences, which, allowing for
indifferences, provide a natural justification for WGARP. Our main focus is WGARP, but we extend
our results to WARP (see our similar characterization of WARP in Section 6.1). In some early demand
literature, WGARP is referred to as the weak weak axiom of revealed preference (Kihlstrom et al., 1976).
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The modern revealed-preference analysis is interested in the study of WGARP due to its
amenability to empirical work. Indeed, recognizing some difficulties in the computational
complexity of standard utility maximization in setups of empirical interest (e.g., stochastic
utility maximization, which is NP-hard to check; see Kitamura and Stoye 2018), there
has been a renewed interest in using WGARP as a minimalist version of the standard
model of rationality. (See, for example, Blundell et al. (2008), Blundell et al. (2014),
Hoderlein and Stoye (2014), Cosaert and Demuynck (2018), and Cherchye et al. (2019).2 )
In addition, many results in general equilibrium, consumer theory, and measurement also
rely on WGARP (e.g., Quah 2008).
Due to the potential lack of transitivity, we work with preference functions instead of
utility functions.3 Our paper provides an exact analog of the classic Afriat’s Theorem, but
for WGARP. Namely, (i) a minimal rationalization of WGARP in terms of a preference
function with only ordinal properties (asymmetry and local nonsatiation); (ii) a characterization of WGARP in terms of Afriat and Varian inequalities (useful for empirical
work); and (iii) a cardinal and tractable representation. In particular, the third item just
mentioned provides a rationalization of WGARP based on a version of the coalitional
multi-utility (CMU) model in Nishimura and Ok (2016). The CMU model allows us to
develop a consumer theory for WGARP and provide a tractable way to model intransitive
consumer behavior. We use a CMU model, which says that a bundle x is ranked over a
bundle y whenever there is at least one coalition of utilities for which every utility inside
it ranks x over y.
To motivate the CMU model, suppose the consumer is trying to figure out her true
preferences over three alternatives A, B, and C. The consumer is endowed with three
coalitions of utilities. Each coalition is associated with a different attribute or mood.
There are three attributes U1 , U2 , and U3 . Coalition U1 contains piecemeal utility u11
(u11 (C) > u11 (B) > u11 (A)), and piecemeal utility u12 (u12 (A) > u12 (C) > u12 (B)).
Coalition U2 contains piecemeal utility u21 (u21 (B) > u21 (A) > u21 (C)), and piecemeal
utility u22 (u22 (A) > u22 (B) > u22 (C)). We need the CMU to satisfy coherency, which
means that both coalitions must share a common utility u∗ (u∗ (A) > u∗ (C) > u∗ (B)).
Finally, U3 contains u31 (u31 (B) > u31 (C) > u31 (A)). In addition, it also contains the
utilities u11 and u21 , yielding coherency.
When she compares A to C, all utilities in U2 agree that A is better than C. As
explained, according to our CMU model, the consumer prefers one alternative to another
2

In all of these papers, WGARP is usually stated without indifference, because the object of interest
is a demand function, not a demand correspondence.
3

In doing so, we follow the tradition of Shafer (1974) and John (2001). Over the consumption set X, a
preference function r is a mapping r : X × X 7→ R. The inequality r(x, y) ≥ 0 means that x is preferred
to y.
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whenever at least one coalition has unanimity in how the piecemeal utilities rank the
two. Then this consumer declares that A is better than C (A  C). Similarly, when she
compares C to B, all utilities in U1 agree that C is preferred to B, and the consumer
declares that C  B. Finally, when comparing A to B, all utilities in U3 agree that B is
better than A, and the consumer declares that B  A. This CMU consumer has produced
a violation of transitivity, as A  C  B  A. However, the consumer is consistent in
any pairwise choice. In particular, coherency guarantees that unanimity on one coalition
implies that there is at least one piecemeal utility in every other coalition that can veto
preference reversals.4
Thus, the CMU notion brings to the forefront the idea of preference formation when
we think of each coalition as representing an attribute, state of mood, or some other
hidden criterion, analogously to that in Richter and Rubinstein (2019). Standard utility
maximization is a special case when the consumer only cares about one attribute (i.e.,
coalition), and there is only one piecemeal utility within the single coalition.
In the standard consumer setting, Theorem 1 in the current paper provides an exact
analog of Afriat’s Theorem for WGARP. In particular, this result states that a data set is
consistent with WGARP if and only if it can be rationalized by a coherent maxmin CMU
preference function.5 A generalization to abstract choice settings, including nonlinear
budgets and infinite data sets, is provided in Theorem 2.
To unpack the statement we just made, we define the notion of rationalization. We
say that a finite data set OT = {pt , xt }t∈T (a collection of prices and commodity bundles)
is rationalized by a preference function r : X × X → R, where X is the consumption set,
if, for all t, r(xt , y) ≥ 0 for any y ∈ X that is affordable at price pt (and wealth pt xt ).
The maxmin CMU preference function is a representation of a preference function.
Let Ω be a family of sets of utilities (coalitions), and let U be a typical element of Ω.
Let u : X 7→ R denote a piecemeal utility function that belongs to U ∈ Ω. Coherency
requires that every pair of coalitions has at least one common element, i.e., U ∩ V 6= ∅
for all U, V ∈ Ω. We say that a coherent maxmin CMU preference rationalizes a data set
function r if, for any x, y ∈ X, we can write r(x, y) as:
r(x, y) = max min(u(x) − u(y)).
U ∈Ω u∈U

Thus, maxmin CMU rationalization can be interpreted as an aggregation of preferences of
an individual with multiple piecemeal utility functions. When figuring out her preference
4

This intransitive behavior is also described, for instance, in Hicks classic example, reproduced as
Example 2.F.1 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995), which gives a data set satisfying WGARP (in its strict form)
but is incompatible with the existence of underlying rational preferences.
5

The result for WARP is similar, simply switching to strict rationalization (Section 6.1).
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over two bundles, this consumer takes the maximum over the minimal difference among the
piecemeal utilities of the two bundles. Hence, she justifies her preferences by saying that
she prefers x over y whenever this ranking is unanimously true for all piecemeal utilities
that belong to at least one coalition. Moreover, all pairs of coalitions share at least some
piecemeal utility, thus limiting–to some extent–internal contradictions, but not enough
to avoid intransitivity. While coherency is a minimal requirement on the CMU that we
show to be empirically equivalent to choices being consistent with WGARP, we note that
the CMU model without any restrictions has no empirical content (Nishimura and Ok
2016). Besides the additional restriction on the CMU, our characterization complements
the results in Nishimura and Ok (2016) since they implicitly assume knowledge of the
entire preference relation while our results are posed in a revealed-preference environment,
which only assumes some knowledge of the consumer’s choices. Indeed, we provide an
extension result analogous to Afriat’s Theorem, while Nishimura and Ok (2016) provide
a representation result analogous to Debreu’s classical utility representation theorem.6
After making these remarks, we refer to the maxmin CMU model simply as the CMU
model in the sequel.7
We show next that WGARP is compatible with the consumer having nonconvex
preferences, which may lead to instances of indecisiveness, i.e., an empty-valued demand
correspondence, in sharp contrast to Afriat’s Theorem for the case of utility maximization.
Nevertheless, we characterize the CMU’s guaranteeing that the consumer problem always
has a solution. The necessary and sufficient condition relies on the Nakamura number
or the minimal number of coalitions in the CMU that share a common piecemeal utility.
Suppose the Nakamura number, which measures the degree of agreement or collegiality
among coalitions, is high enough. In that case, the associated demand correspondence
will be nonempty.8 In addition, we provide a sufficient condition, more closely tied to a
relaxation of convexity. The new sufficient condition is called “total coherency in segments”
and requires that when restricting the piecemeal utilities to any straight-line segment in
the commodity space, all coalitions share a common piecemeal ranking. (Indeed, we also
6

There is a way to connect both approaches: for instance, see Lemma 2.

7

In a related model of choice under risk, Hara et al. (2019) is the first to define the coherence property
over a collection of coalitions of utilities. However, they use a minimax coherent CMU representation,
which implies completeness of the preference relation. In contrast, our maxmin coherent CMU model
allows for both incomplete and intransitive preferences, but it imposes a critical regularity condition, i.e.,
asymmetry of the preference function (see Lemma 1.)
8

Using another new result characterizing the Nakamura number condition in terms of k-acyclicity, a
weakening of GARP, all is needed to guarantee nonemptiness of the demand correspondence is that the
data not contain revealed-preference cycles of length smaller than the number of goods. The Nakamura
number is an important measure of agreement in the literature on preference aggregation (Schofield,
1984).
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show that the classical requirement of convexity in preferences, guaranteeing a solution
to the consumer problem for the Shafer’s (1974) nontransitive consumer implies total
coherency in segments.)
The CMU model allows us to obtain standard textbook results for WGARP, such
as homogeneity of degree 0 of the demand correspondence and the satisfaction of the
compensated law of demand, and it offers some computational advantages due to its
functional form. Beyond all these (positive) findings for consumer theory, we provide
a new way to perform welfare analysis for the CMU. This welfare analysis bounds the
set of alternatives that are ranked above a given commodity bundle. These new bounds
are robust to failures of transitivity and convexity of preferences. Moreover, with a
simple switch from weak to strict inequalities, we also demonstrate that the CMU model
characterizes WARP, and by adding a quasilinearity restriction, the CMU delivers choices
satisfying the law of demand.
The plan of the paper is as follows. After preliminaries are introduced in Section
2, Section 3 presents our characterizations of WGARP. Section 4 provides a textbook
consumer theory for WGARP and the coherent CMU. Section 5 develops the corresponding
welfare analysis. Section 6 notes the extensions of our main results to WARP and choices
obeying the law of demand, as well as the extended literature review, all found in the
online appendix. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.

2. Preliminaries
Although our main result also covers abstract choice problems (as detailed at the end
of the next section), we want to connect with the traditional revealed-preference literature
and begin by presenting the classic consumer problem. Suppose that a consumer chooses
bundles consisting of L ≥ 2 goods. We assume that we have access to a finite number of
observations, denoted by T , on the prices and chosen quantities of these goods, where
observations are indexed by T = {1, . . . , T }. Let xt ∈ X ≡ RL+ \ {0} denote the bundle of
goods at observation t ∈ T, which was purchased at prices pt ∈ P ≡ RL++ . We impose
Walras’ law throughout: wealth at observation t is equivalent to pt xt ∈ R++ , for all t ∈ T.9
We write OT = {pt , xt }t∈T to denote all price-quantity observations, and refer to OT as
PL
We use the following notation: The inner product of two vectors x, y ∈ RL is defined as xy = l=1 xl yl .
For all (x, y) ∈ RL , x = y if xi ≥ yi for all i = 1, . . . , L; x ≥ y if x = y and x 6= y; and x > y
L
if xi > yi for all i = 1, . . . , L. As is customary, we denote RL
: x = (0, . . . , 0)} and
+ = {x ∈ R
L
L
R++ = {x ∈ R : x > (0, . . . , 0)}.
9
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the data. In practice, the data OT describe a single consumer observed over time.

2.1. Revealed Preference
We begin by recalling some key definitions in the revealed-preference literature.
Definition 1. (Direct revealed preferred relations) We say that xt is directly revealed
preferred to xs , written xt R,D xs , when pt xt ≥ pt xs . Also, xt is strictly and directly
revealed preferred to xs , written xt R,D xs , when pt xt > pt xs .
If xt is directly revealed preferred to xs , the consumer chose xt and not xs , when both
bundles were affordable. If xt is strictly and directly revealed preferred to xs , then she
could also have saved money by choosing xs . These definitions only compare pairs of
bundles. We can extend them to compare any subset of bundles by using the transitive
closure of the direct relation:
Definition 2. (Revealed preferred relations) We say that xt is revealed preferred to xs ,
written xt R xs , when there is a chain (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) with elements on X with x1 = xt
and xn = xs such that x1 R,D x2 R,D . . . R,D xn . Also, xt is strictly revealed preferred
to xs , written xt R xs , when at least one of the directly revealed relations in the revealed
preferred chain are strict.
Next, we use these binary relations to define axioms that characterize different types of
consistent consumer behavior. We begin with Samuelson’s (1938) weak axiom of revealed
preference:
Axiom 1. (WARP) The weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) holds if there is no
pair of observations s, t ∈ T such that xt R,D xs and xs R,D xt , with xt 6= xs .
Kihlstrom et al. (1976) introduces a generalized version of WARP:
Axiom 2. (WGARP) The weak generalized axiom of revealed preference (WGARP) holds
if there is no pair of observations s, t ∈ T such that xt R,D xs and xs R,D xt .
Samuelson (1948) shows how WARP can be used to construct a set of indifference
curves in the L = 2 case, but also recognizes that WARP is not enough to characterize
rationality when L > 2. Responding to this challenge, Houthakker (1950) introduces the
strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP), which makes use of transitive comparisons
between bundles as implied by the revealed-preference relation:
Axiom 3. (SARP) The strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP) holds if there is no
pair of observations s, t ∈ T such that xt R xs and xs R,D xt , with xt 6= xs .
7

Varian (1982) notes that SARP requires single-valued demand functions, and argues
that it is empirically more convenient to work with demand correspondences and “flat”
indifference curves. To accommodate these properties, Varian introduces the generalized
axiom of revealed preference (GARP):
Axiom 4. (GARP) The generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) holds if there
is no pair of observations s, t ∈ T such that xt R xs and xs R,D xt .
In the L = 2 case, as is well known, SARP is equivalent to WARP (Rose 1958), and
GARP is equivalent to WGARP (Banerjee and Murphy 2006).
We focus on characterizing the weaker notion of demand correspondences (WGARP)
in our principal analysis, leaving the characterization of the stricter notion of single-valued
demand functions (WARP) to Section 6.1. But first, we recall the main results from
the revealed-preference literature that are needed in order to introduce our contribution.
Consider the following definition of rationalization:10
Definition 3. (Utility rationalization) Consider a finite data set OT = {pt , xt }t∈T and a
utility function u : X 7→ R. For all y ∈ X and all t ∈ T such that pt y ≤ pt xt , the data
OT is rationalized by u if u(xt ) ≥ u(y).
Afriat’s (1967) fundamental theorem is well known:
Theorem A. (Afriat’s theorem, Varian 1982) Consider a finite data set OT = {pt , xt }t∈T .
The following statements are equivalent:
(i) The data OT can be rationalized by a locally nonsatiated utility function.
(ii) The data OT satisfies GARP.
(iii) There exist numbers U t and λt > 0 for all t ∈ T such that the Afriat inequalities:

U t − U s ≥ λt pt (xt − xs ),
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
(iv) There exist numbers V t for all t ∈ T such that the Varian inequalities:

if pt (xt − xs ) ≥ 0 then, V t − V s ≥ 0,
We say that a utility function u : X 7→ R is: (i) continuous if for any sequence (xn ) for n ∈ N+ such
that xn ∈ X and limn→∞ xn = x with x ∈ X implies limn→∞ u(xn ) = u(x); (ii) locally nonsatiated if for
any x ∈ X and for any  > 0, there exists y ∈ B(x, ) where B(x, ) = {z ∈ X| ||z − x|| ≤ } such that
u(y) > u(x); (iii) strictly increasing if for x, y ∈ X, x ≥ y implies u(x) > u(y); and (iv) concave if for any
x, y ∈ X, we have u(x) − u(y) ≥ ξ (x − y), for ξ ∈ ∂u(y), where ∂u(y) is the superdifferential of u.
10
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if pt (xt − xs ) > 0 then, V t − V s > 0,
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
(v) The data OT can be rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing, and concave

utility function.
There are three messages of Afriat’s theorem. First, the equivalence of (i) and (ii)
gives a minimal rationalization in terms of purely ordinal conditions (local nonsatiation,
completeness, and transitivity of an underlying preference relation). Second, statements
(ii), (iii), and (iv) give testable conditions that are easy to implement in practice. Moreover,
third, statement (v) gives a rationalization in terms of a cardinal (concave) utility function.
Their equivalence means, in particular, that continuity, monotonicity, and concavity are
nontestable properties. In other words, separate violations of any of these properties
cannot be detected in finite data sets.
Varian (1982) shows that the numbers U t and λt in statement (iii) can be interpreted
as measures of the utility level and marginal utility level of income at observation t ∈ T.
Analogously, the numbers V t in statement (iv) can be interpreted as measures of the
utility levels at the observed demands (Demuynck and Hjertstrand, 2019).

2.2. Preference Functions
We define a preference function as follows:
Definition 4. (Preference function) A preference function, r : X × X → R, maps ordered
pairs of commodity bundles to real numbers.
A preference function is a more flexible numerical representation of a consumer’s
preferences than a utility function, for example, with nontransitive preferences. If r(x, y) ≥
0 then the consumer prefers bundle x to y. Similarly, if r(x, y) > 0, x is strictly
preferred to y. Next, we present two properties of preference functions that feature in our
characterizations of WGARP:
Definition 5. (Asymmetry) We say that a preference function r : X × X 7→ R is
asymmetric if r(x, y) ≥ (>)0 implies r(y, x) ≤ (<)0 for all x, y ∈ X.
Asymmetry is an ordinal concept stating that if the consumer prefers x over y, then
she cannot simultaneously strictly prefer y over x. The notion of asymmetry can be
further strengthened to obtain a cardinal version, called skew-symmetry:

9

Definition 6. (Skew-symmetry) We say that a preference function r : X × X 7→ R is
skew-symmetric if r(x, y) = −r(y, x) for all x, y ∈ X.
Skew-symmetry means that the preference function r induces a preference order on
X that is complete and asymmetric. This property was studied by Shafer (1974) in his
study of a theory of nontransitive consumers.
Next, we formally define some other important properties of preference functions:
Definition 7. Consider a preference function r : X × X → R. We say that:
(i) r is complete if for any x, y ∈ X, either r(x, y) ≥ 0 or r(y, x) ≥ 0.
(ii) r is continuous if for all y ∈ X and any sequence {xn } of elements in X that

converges to x ∈ X it must be that limn→∞ r (xn , y) = r (x, y).11
(iii) r is locally nonsatiated if for any x, y ∈ X such that r (x, y) = 0 and for any  > 0,

there exists a y 0 ∈ B(y, ) such that r (x, y 0 ) < 0.12
(iv) r is strictly increasing if for all x, y, z ∈ X, x ≥ z implies r(x, y) > r(z, y).
(v) r is quasiconcave if for all x, y, z ∈ X and any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 we have r (λx + (1 − λ) z, y) ≥

min {r (x, y) , r (z, y)} , and strictly quasiconcave if, for any 0 < λ < 1, the inequality
is strict whenever x 6= z.
(vi) r is concave if for all x, y, z ∈ X and any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 we have r (λx + (1 − λ) z, y) ≥

λr (x, y) + (1 − λ) r (z, y), and strictly concave if, for any 0 < λ < 1, the inequality
is strict whenever x 6= z.
(vii) r is piecewise concave if there is a set of concave functions in the first argument,

ft (x, y) for t ∈ K, where K is a compact set, such that r (x, y) = maxt∈K {ft (x, y)},
and strictly piecewise concave if there is a similar set of strictly concave functions.
Completeness is a weak condition to ensure that the preference function can rank all
bundles. Continuity is a technical condition that is convenient to ensure the existence of
a maximum in the constrained maximization of the preference function (Sonnenschein
1971). Local nonsatiation rules out thick indifference curves: if we take an arbitrarily
small neighborhood of a bundle that is indifferent to a given bundle x, the neighborhood
contains bundles that dominate x. Strict monotonicity means that “more is better”.
11

We state the weaker versions of these properties, as all we need is to work with movements in one of
the arguments.
12

The following stronger version of this assumption is the standard LNS of a preference relation: for
any x, y ∈ X such that r (x, y) = 0 and for any  > 0, there exists a y 0 ∈ B(y, ) such that r (y 0 , x) > 0.
Thus, strictly speaking, a better name for our definition is perhaps weak local nonsatiation.
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Quasiconcavity says that for any fixed y ∈ X, a mixture of two bundles x, z ∈ X is at least
as good as the worst of the two bundles, according to the preference function. Concavity
is a cardinal version of quasiconcavity. Both are essential properties because they ensure
well-behaved optimization problems. More precisely, quasiconcavity guarantees that a
function defined on a compact set has a convex set of maxima, while a strictly concave
function defined on a compact set always has a unique global maximum.
Piecewise concavity and its strict version are new properties, which are especially
important for our cardinal characterization of WGARP.13 The property implies that for a
fixed y ∈ X, a mixture of two bundles x, z ∈ X is at least as good as the worst one of the
two bundles, but only if x, z are close enough. In other words, this is a local version of
concavity, i.e., concavity implies piecewise concavity but not vice versa. This property
provides tractability to the consumer maximization problem of the CMU (see Section 4).
It is helpful to translate the notions of quasiconcavity, concavity, and piecewise
concavity of a preference function into properties of the underlying preference relation.
Concavity or quasiconcavity of a preference function implies convexity of the preference
relation –upper contour sets being convex sets. In turn, the preference relation’s convexity
implies the star-shapedness of its upper contour set (i.e., if x is preferred to y, any bundle
in the convex combination of x and y is also preferred to y). Piecewise concavity of
a preference function does not imply the preference relation’s convexity but the starshapedness property.
Finally, we define the notion of rationalization by a preference function, which is
analogous to utility rationalization in Definition 3:
Definition 8. (Preference function rationalization) Consider a finite data set OT =
{pt , xt }t∈T and a preference function r : X × X 7→ R. For all y ∈ X and all t ∈ T such
that pt y ≤ pt xt , the data OT is rationalized by r if r(xt , y) ≥ 0.

2.3. The Coalitional Multi-Utility Model
In this subsection, we introduce a particular representation of a preference function,
which is essential for our cardinal characterization of WGARP.
Definition 9. (Coalitional (strict) multi-utility model) We say that the preference function
r(x, y) is a coalitional (strict) multi-utility (CMU) function if, for any x, y ∈ X, it can be
written as:
r(x, y) = max min(u(x) − u(y)),
U ∈Ω u∈U

13

See Zangwill (1967) and Tsevendorj (2001) for a detailed discussion of piecewise-concave functions.
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where Ω is a compact family of compact sets of piecemeal utility functions and any piecemeal
utility function u is continuous, strictly increasing, and (strictly) concave.14
Note that the classical utility maximization model is a special case of the CMU
model when the set of coalitions and sets of utilities are singletons, in which case,
r(x, y) = u(x) − u(y) for the single utility function u.
As presented in Definition 9, the CMU model is too general for our purposes, and
we need to impose further structure to characterize WGARP. In particular, we will only
consider CMU preference functions that are coherent:
Definition 10. Consider the CMU preference function r in Definition 9. We say that r
is coherent if the compact set Ω is such that for any U, Û ∈ Ω, there exists a u ∈ U ∩ Û .
Coherency allows us to establish the following result:
Lemma 1. (Coherency) If a preference function r is a coherent CMU function, then r is
asymmetric.
By Definitions 9 and 10, the coherent CMU preference function is continuous, strictly
increasing, and piecewise concave (in the first argument). However, the coherent CMU
model is neither skew-symmetric nor (quasi-)concave, which means that it does allow
for preferences that are neither complete nor convex. This model is, therefore, different
from the nontransitive (skew-symmetric) consumer model studied in Shafer (1974), which
represents both complete and convex preferences. In the next section, we show that
WGARP is empirically equivalent to a rationalization of a piecewise-concave CMU
preference function but that this function generally is not concave. Moreover, this
rationalizing function represents preferences with the star-shapedness property of upper
contour sets, but it may not represent convex preferences. Of course, it is true that, if one
considers sufficiently large finite data sets, the gap between the star-shapedness property
and the convexity of the preference becomes very narrow.
While our main results offer characterizations of WGARP and WARP in terms of
coherent CMU preference functions, there should be a way to translate them into the
language of preference relations. Going in this direction, we close this section by offering
such a connection. This general representation result answers the question of what
preference relations can be represented by asymmetric preference functions, and it is an
extension of the representation theorem in Nishimura and Ok (2016). Before establishing
our connecting result, we need some preliminaries. A preference relation is denoted by
14

For the standard consumer setting, we endow the space Ω with a suitable topology, while we use the
usual topology for the finite-dimensional Euclidean space of commodities (see, for example, Nishimura and
Ok (2016)). For more abstract settings, we work with an order structure, as detailed in Subsection 3.3.
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⊆ X × X. We say that  is reflexive if for all x ∈ X, x  x and continuous if upper
contour sets are closed subsets of X × X. Moreover, for any bundles x, y ∈ X, x  y
if x  y and ¬y  x, and  is asymmetric if: (i) x  y implies ¬y  x, and (ii) x  y
implies ¬y  x.
Lemma 2. (Representation) The following statements are equivalent:
(i)  is reflexive and asymmetric.
(ii) For all x, y ∈ X, x  ()y if and only if r(x, y) = supU ∈Ω inf u∈U (u(x) − u(y)) ≥

(>)0, where Ω is a nonempty collection of continuous utility functions satisfying
coherency.
In addition to reflexivity (as in Nishimura and Ok (2016)), we also have asymmetry of
the preference relation. We note that a CMU preference function is always reflexive (i.e.,
r(x, x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X).15

3. Complete characterizations of WGARP
This section presents characterizations of WGARP in consumer settings and in abstract
choice settings, and an example illustrating how WGARP may be incompatible with
convex preferences.

3.1. The Consumer Choice Setting
The next theorem provides a revealed-preference characterization of WGARP for
finite data sets. This result mirrors Afriat’s theorem, relying on preference-function
rationalization (as opposed to utility rationalization):
Theorem 1. Consider a finite data set OT = {pt , xt }t∈T . The following statements are
equivalent:
(i) The data OT can be rationalized by a locally nonsatiated and asymmetric preference

function.
15

We also note that if  is continuous (and X is compact), then we can strengthen the representation
theorem and have that Ω be a compact collection of nonempty compact subsets of the set of continuous
utility functions. Then, the sup and inf operators can be replaced by max and min.
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(ii) The data OT satisfies WGARP.
(iii) There exist numbers Rt,s and λtts > 0 for all s, t ∈ T with Rt,s = −Rs,t and λtts = λtst

such that inequalities:
Rt,s ≥ λtts pt (xt − xs ),
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
(iv) There exist numbers W t,s for all s, t ∈ T with W t,s = −W s,t such that inequalities:

if pt (xt − xs ) ≥ 0 then, W t,s ≥ 0,
if pt (xt − xs ) > 0 then, W t,s > 0,
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
(v) The data OT can be rationalized by a coherent CMU preference function (which, in

particular, is asymmetric, continuous, monotonic, and piecewise concave).
This theorem is an exact analog of Afriat’s theorem, but for WGARP and using
preference-function rationalizations. First, the equivalence of (i) and (ii) identifies a
minimal set of purely ordinal properties (asymmetry and local nonsatiation) of a preference
function rationalizing data obeying WGARP. This equivalence is essentially an extension
theorem of the revealed-preference relation satisfying WGARP (defined on the data set)
to a preference function (defined over X) with the asymmetry and local nonsatiation
properties.16 Second, the equivalence of statements (ii), (iii), and (iv) provides practical
inequalities for empirical work. Furthermore, third, the equivalence of (ii) and (v) is a
cardinal rationalization, whose main difference with Afriat’s rationalization of GARP is
piecewise concavity instead of concavity. Since the CMU preference function in statement
(v) also is asymmetric, continuous, monotonic, and piecewise concave, the equivalence of
(i) and (v) shows that if the data can be rationalized by any nontrivial preference function
at all, it can be rationalized by a preference function that satisfies continuity, monotonicity,
and piecewise concavity. Put differently, separate violations of these properties cannot be
detected in finite data sets.
The numbers Rt,s and λtst in statement (iii) have a similar interpretation as in Afriat’s
theorem for each pair of local utilities; that is, if we consider t, s ∈ T, then Rt,s is a
measure of the utility difference uts (xt ) − uts (xs ) for that particular pairwise data set,
while λtst is a measure of the marginal utility of income at observation t ∈ T in that
pairwise data set.
16

We will show later in a corollary that completeness can also be obtained in the extension result.
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The proof of Theorem 1 shows that the property of asymmetry in statement (v) may
be further strengthened to skew-symmetry, by establishing the following equivalence:
Corollary 1. The data OT can be rationalized by a continuous, monotonic, piecewiseconcave, and skew-symmetric preference function if and only if OT satisfies WGARP.
This corollary helps to analyze a well-known claim in Kihlstrom et al. (1976). The
claim conjectures that WGARP is empirically equivalent to a consumer maximizing an
underlying preference function that is skew-symmetric, continuous, and quasiconcave.17
Our characterization of WGARP shows that this conjecture would be false in finite data
sets since a piecewise-concave preference function characterizes WGARP. Furthermore,
again, we acknowledge that the gap between our star-shapedness implied property and
convex preferences seem to disappear in infinite data sets, hence lending support to the
KMS conjecture.18

3.2. On WGARP and Convexity of Preferences
In this subsection, we elaborate further on the last point made in the previous section
by showing, employing a counterexample, that Kihlstrom et al.’s (1976) conjecture that
the Shafer model can rationalize WGARP does not hold in finite data sets.
Example 1. (Keiding and Tvede 2013, Example 1, p.467). Consider the data set O3
with prices p1 = (4, 1, 5)0 , p2 = (5, 4, 1)0 , p3 = (1, 5, 4)0 , and bundles x1 = (4, 1, 1)0 ,
x2 = (1, 4, 1)0 , x3 = (1, 1, 4)0 . It is easy to verify that this data set satisfies WGARP.
Consider a new unobserved commodity bundle, xT +1 :
1
xT +1 = (x1 + x2 + x3 ) = (2, 2, 2)0 .
3
The question is whether there exists a price-vector pT +1 such that the extended data set
O3 ∪ (pT +1 , xT +1 ) satisfies WGARP. Note that pt (xt − xT +1 ) = 2 > 0, for all t = 1, 2, 3.
But this implies that there is no p ∈ P such that p(xT +1 − xt ) < 0 simultaneously for all
t = 1, 2, 3. Hence, the extended data set violates WGARP.
17

To be fair to KMS, the models are slightly different: KMS work with entire demand functions and
does not use preference functions but preference relations.
18

Note that removing the coherence restriction on the CMU means that the CMU can rationalize
any data set. Indeed, following the arguments of Theorem 1, take a data set OT , and break it into
smaller data sets of size one such that OtT = (pt , xt ) for all t. By Afriat’s theorem, any data set with one
observation can always be rationalized by a continuous, concave, and, crucially, monotone utility. Note
that this utility function is linear. Then we can build T coalitions containing one of these utilities. It can
be shown that the CMU defined using these coalitions rationalizes the data set OT . Although this always
works, the constructed CMU is not coherent.
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Using Theorem 1, we can also clarify the source of this failure, traced to a violation of
strict quasiconcavity of the preference function. Since the observed data satisfies WGARP,
by Theorem 1, there is a preference function r rationalizing the data. Moreover, we have
r(x1 , x2 ) ≥ 0, r(x2 , x3 ) ≥ 0, and r(x3 , x1 ) ≥ 0. In addition, we know that the new bundle,
xT +1 , is a convex combination of the observed bundles and different from each of them.
In our case, if the preference function is strictly quasiconcave in its first argument, then
we must have r(xT +1 , xT +1 ) = 0 > mint=1,2,3 {r(xt , xT +1 )}. This implies that xT +1 must
be revealed to be strictly better than at least one of the three observed bundles x1 , x2 , or
x3 , i.e., r(xt , xT +1 ) < 0 for at least one t = 1, 2, 3. However, note that, for all t = 1, 2, 3,
we have pt (xt − xT +1 ) = 2 > 0. Thus, by the rationalization of Theorem 1, all observed
commodity bundles must be weakly preferred to the new bundle, i.e., r(xt , xT +1 ) ≥ 0 for
all t = 1, 2, 3, a contradiction. Hence, the extended data set O3 ∪ {p, xT +1 } cannot be
rationalized by a strictly quasiconcave and asymmetric (or, of course, skew-symmetric)
preference function. Also, it follows that it cannot be rationalized by a strictly concave
and skew-symmetric preference function either, akin to the Shafer model of a concave
nontransitive consumer (John, 2001). Nevertheless, as already pointed out, the gap
between the piecewise concavity of the preference function in our characterization of
WGARP and convex preferences seems to become negligible in infinite data sets, as the
star-shapedness property would then “fill up” essentially the entire upper contour sets.19
Alternatively, suppose the new bundle added was xT +2 = (2.1, 2.1, 2.1), using the same
steps. In that case, we can argue that the extended data set would violate WGARP,
and that there is no quasiconcave, monotonic, and asymmetric preference function that
rationalizes the extended data. Alternatively, one could use local nonsatiation instead of
monotonicity to arrive at the same conclusion. Monotonicity or local nonsatiation, just
like strict quasiconcavity, are vehicles to generate the strict inequality for the preference
function.20
Interestingly, this example shows that, along with local nonsatiation, quasiconcavity
of the preference function is, in fact, a testable property in finite data sets. As such, this
sheds light also on Samuelson’s eternal darkness conjecture, saying that any finite data
set can always be rationalized by a convex preference relation.
19

We thank Phil Reny for raising a question that led us to this conjecture.
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There is a related example in Section 7.3 of Kim and Richter (1986). That example uses infinite data
and is written for L = 2, where GARP and WGARP coincide, ruling out the intransitivity present in our
example.
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3.3. Abstract Choice Settings
In the remainder of this section, we generalize our characterization of WGARP to
a classical abstract choice environment. This result extends our equivalence between
WGARP and the coherent CMU model to a wide variety of different domains, including
nonlinear budgets (Forges and Minelli, 2009) and the case of infinite data.
Consider a nonempty choice set X. Let this space be endowed with primitive order
pair (≥, >). We assume that X is order (≥, >) dense separable, i.e., there is a countable
set Y = {yk }k∈N ⊆ X such that, whenever x > y with x, z ∈ X, there exist a yk ∈ Y such
that x > yk > z. In addition, we assume that the order-pair (≥, >) is acyclic and that
x > y ≥ z implies x > z.
Let A ⊆ 2X \ ∅ be a collection of menus. Define a choice correspondence as
c : A → 2X ,
such that c(A) ⊆ A and c(A) 6= ∅ for all A ∈ A. A data set is an array D = (A, c(A))A∈A .
We say a menu A ∈ A is comprehensive with respect to the pair (≥, >) whenever
x ∈ A and x ≥ y implies y ∈ A. Moreover, we let x D y if x ∈ c(A) for some A ∈ A
such that y ∈ A. We define the relations R as x R y if x D y and x R y if there is
a B ∈ A and z ∈ B where {x, y, z} ⊆ B, x ∈ c(B), and z > y. WGARP is defined as
follows:
Definition 11. A dataset D satisfies WGARP if x R y imply not y R x.
Next, consider the following definition of rationalization:
Definition 12. We say that a data set D is rationalized by a preference function r :
X × X → R if
c(A) ⊆ {x ∈ A : r(x, y) ≥ 0 ∀ y ∈ A}.
This notion of rationalization generalizes the traditional notion of rationalization for
preference functions. We define the CMU model as follows:
Definition 13. (General CMU) We say that a preference function is a general coalitional
multi-utility (general CMU) representation, r, if there exists a family of collections of
utility functions u : X → R, such that:
r(x, y) = sup inf (u(x) − u(y)),
U ∈Ω u∈U

for all x, y ∈ X, where every u ∈ ∪U ∈Ω U is monotonic on the order pair (≥, >) (i.e., if
x ≥ (>)y then u(x) ≥ (>)u(y)).
17

In contrast to the consumer choice setting previously considered, the general CMU
in the classical abstract choice setting relaxes the concavity assumption of each utility
function. Notably, Definition 13 does not require that Ω or U are compact. However, this
definition maintains the monotonicity properties of each piecemeal utility with respect to
a primitive order-pair (≥, >). The following theorem gives a complete characterization of
WGARP for the classical case where the observed choice correspondence is assumed to be
nonempty:
Theorem 2. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) The data D can be rationalized by a coherent general CMU preference function.
(ii) The data D satisfies WGARP and all menus are comprehensive.

We can contrast our results to the classical textbook characterization of WGARP
in Mas-Colell et al. (1995). There, it is shown that if a dataset D contains all binary
and ternary menus and the choice correspondence is nonempty in all of these (i.e., a rich
dataset), then WGARP is equivalent to rationalization by a utility function. The rational
model is a particular case of the coherent CMU model we consider here. Our result covers
datasets that may not be rich. Importantly, we only assume that the choice correspondence
is nonempty on A, allowing for the correspondence to be empty elsewhere (outside of the
collection of observed menus). If we assume that the choice correspondence is observed
in infinite data and is always nonempty, our result will still hold, thus generalizing the
results in Kim and Richter (1986). Note that even when the work of Kim and Richter
(1986) does not assume comprehensive menus; our results can be directly extended to
their setup. In closing this section, we note that the proof technique used to establish the
results in this section could be adapted to obtain the general characterization of rational
behavior in Nishimura et al. (2017) in order to provide a rationalization of WGARP in
a broader collection of choice domains. Indeed, the techniques developed in this paper
allow us to adapt existing results in revealed preference for rationality behavior for the
case of WGARP because the existing results can be applied to the piecemeal utilities of
the CMU.

4. Basic Consumer Theory for the Coherent CMU
In the previous section, we provided characterizations of WGARP based on the
coherent CMU model. We also saw how WGARP might be incompatible with quasiconcave
18

preference functions. In this section, we investigate the essential open question of the
consumer preference maximization problem with a coherent CMU representation, focusing
on counterfactual demand analysis. That is, for a new (possibly unobserved) price vector
pT +1 , we study whether WGARP can predict demand generically. As such, we need to
formalize what it means for WGARP to make out-of-sample predictions. The exercise is
a sort of dual to that in Example 1, and our conclusions are similar.
We are interested in the following object:
Definition 14. (W-Demand Set) Let a finite data set OT satisfy WGARP. We define
the W-demand set, or the set of all additional bundles compatible with WGARP given a
new price, by
D(pT +1 , wT +1 ) = {x ∈ X : OT ∪ {pT +1 , x} satisfies WGARP and pT +1 x = wT +1 }.
We obtain a negative result that seems to be new to the literature. In particular,
the following lemma shows that, for some prices, the W-demand set may be empty,
implying that, for these prices, it is impossible to predict demand using WGARP. That is,
indecisiveness shows up, even in some pairwise comparisons of observations.
Lemma 3. (Impossibility) There are data sets OT such that for an open set of out-ofsample prices pT +1 ∈ P , the W-demand set is empty, i.e., D(pT +1 , wT +1 ) ≡ ∅.
We now illustrate Lemma 3 through a counterexample for a single price. The fact that
there exists an open set of prices for which the W-demand set is empty shows that the
counterexample does not constitute a degenerate case but is also robust to perturbations
of the out-of-sample price.
Example 2. (Empty-demand counterfactuals) Consider again the data set O3 with prices
p1 = (4, 1, 5)0 , p2 = (5, 4, 1)0 , p3 = (1, 5, 4)0 , and bundles x1 = (4, 1, 1)0 , x2 = (1, 4, 1)0 ,
x3 = (1, 1, 4)0 . Note that the income level in all observations is the same, i.e., pt xt = 22
for all t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. As noted in Example 1, this data set satisfies WGARP. Suppose
the out-of-sample budget is: pT +1 = 13 (p1 + p2 + p3 ) =

10
(1, 1, 1)0
3
T +1

assume towards a contradiction that there exists a bundle x

and wT +1 = 22. Now,

in the set D(pT +1 , wT +1 ).

Note that xT +1 is directly revealed preferred to xt , because 22 = pT +1 xT +1 > pT +1 xt = 20
for all t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. By definition, it must be that pt xt < pt xT +1 for all t ∈ {1, 2, 3},
such that WGARP (and WARP) holds. However, averaging these inequalities, we get
22 = 13 (p1 x1 + p2 x2 + p3 x3 ) < pT +1 xT +1 = 22, where the right-hand side of the inequality
follows from the definition of pT +1 . Hence, we obtain a contradiction, and can conclude
that D(pT +1 , wT +1 ) = ∅.
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4.1. Nonempty-Valued Demand Correspondences under WGARP
We have shown that the rationalization of a coherent CMU preference function is
empirically equivalent to WGARP. The following result says that maximizing the coherent
CMU preference function may lead to indecisiveness, i.e., an empty-valued demand
correspondence. Defining B(p, w) as the budget set, i.e., B(p, w) = {x ∈ X : px ≤ w}, we
have:
Lemma 4. The demand correspondence x(p, w) ∈ {x ∈ B(p, w) : [maxU ∈Ω minu∈U (u(x)−
u(y)) ≥ 0 ∀ y ∈ B(p, w)]} may be empty-valued for some prices and income pairs (p, w),
where p ∈ P and w > 0.
The proof of this lemma follows directly from Lemma 3 and our primary characterization
result in Theorem 1. In contrast, if the consumer is a utility maximizer, there always
exists a nonempty-valued demand correspondence. In other words, if observed prices and
choices satisfy GARP, it is always possible to rank-order observed bundles by a utility.
Crucially, this negative result is independent of the CMU representation. In other
words, indecisiveness is a property of WGARP, and not of the underlying representation.
Indeed, the possibility of indecisiveness will carry on to any representation of WGARP,
including the coherent CMU.
Indecisiveness is a real possibility in practice, and Gerasimou (2018) shows that it
also features in other contexts. For our coherent CMU representation, when the demand
correspondence image x(p, w) is empty, it is obvious that no coalition of utilities U ∈ Ω
have agreed on the best alternative that is also feasible. In fact, for every x ∈ B(p, w),
there is a feasible y ∈ B(p, w) such that for some coalition of utilities, U ∈ Ω and for all
u ∈ U it follows that y is strictly preferred to x (i.e., u(y) > u(x)). That is, at least one
coalition may “block” choosing some feasible object.
Without going all the way to convexity, given the negative result in Lemma 4, it is
helpful to establish conditions that are weaker than transitivity but are enough to ensure
that the demand correspondence associated with a coherent CMU preference function is
nonempty-valued. These conditions require that the CMU preference function is complete,
which we note, by the proof of Theorem 1, always can be assumed without loss of generality
(given that the data satisfies WGARP).21
In the remainder of this subsection, we will first present a necessary and sufficient
condition to guarantee that WGARP generates a nonempty demand correspondence.
The proof of Theorem 1 is constructive and shows that a data set OT satisfying WGARP can be
rationalized by a complete, locally nonsatiated, and asymmetric preference function. The family of sets
of utilities Ω of a complete CMU preference must contain, for each pair x, y ∈ X, a U ∈ Ω such that for
any u, v ∈ U , u(x) ≥ u(y) ⇐⇒ v(x) ≥ v(y).
21
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Then, we will present a weak sufficient condition, closer to a relaxation of convexity, that
also gives nonempty demands.
4.1.a. A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Nonemptiness Based on the Nakamura
Number.– The coherent CMU can be viewed as an instance of preference aggregation in
the simple voting games literature.22 A coherent CMU is a proper simple voting game.
This connection is valuable because it allows to exploit restrictions in the literature of
simple games that guarantee the nonemptiness of the demand correspondence under the
coherent CMU. We first define the Nakamura number, ν, as:
ν = min{|Ω̂| | Ω̂ ⊆ Ω and ∩U ∈Ω̂ U = ∅}.
When Ω has a collection of coalitions that share a common piecemeal utility, then ν is
defined as ∞. The Nakamura number of a CMU captures the cardinality of the minimal
number of coalitions that contain a common piecemeal utility. Applying the results in
Schofield (1984), we can show the following:
Theorem 3. If a complete and coherent CMU preference function has an associated
Nakamura number, ν, such that ν − 1 ≥ L, then the demand correspondence is nonemptyvalued for all p ∈ P and w > 0.
This result sheds light on the connection between the structure of the CMU, particularly
the level of collegiality across coalitions, and the nonemptiness of the associated demand
correspondence. The concavity of the piecemeal utilities plays a key role, as well as the
compactness of the coalitions.
Due to the coherency restriction, the Nakamura number must be ν ≥ 3 for our CMU.
This Nakamura number implies the nonemptiness of the demand correspondence for L = 2,
and any such data set satisfying WGARP can be rationalized by a non-empty demand
correspondence. Note that when Ω has a collection of coalitions that share a common
piecemeal utility, then nonemptiness of the demand correspondence is guaranteed for any
number of goods. Of course, the condition provided in Theorem 3 is much weaker than
this form of total coherency. We remark that the restriction on the Nakamura number,
ν − 1 ≥ L, is effectively a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the
demand correspondence.23 Finally, we highlight that Theorem 3 can be extended trivially
22

See Martin and Salles (2013) for a recent survey on voting games as procedures to aggregate individual
preferences. We are very grateful to Chris Chambers for pointing out the connection to the voting games
literature.
23

Schofield (1984) shows that the condition is necessary because examples have been built with empty
demand correspondences when the condition above fails. Also, note that without completeness, we can
only guarantee the existence of a nondominated alternative in a budget set.
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to nonlinear and compact budgets.
4.1.b. A Simple Testable Condition to Ensure Nonemptiness..– The previous subsection
established that a CMU with Nakamura number ν ≥ L + 1 has a nonempty demand
correspondence under completeness; based on this result, we will now formulate a condition
to test if the demand correspondence associated with the rationalizing preference function
is nonempty. This condition takes as primitive a finite data set OT , and is a test if OT
admits a rationalization by a CMU whose Nakamura number weakly exceeds L + 1.
To derive our new condition, we will establish a characterization of a CMU with
Nakamura number, ν, satisfying ν ≥ k + 1, where k is any positive integer number.
This result will cover as a particular case ν ≥ 3, which corresponds to the coherent
CMU. Our result illustrates that a bound on the Nakamura number of a CMU has
observable implications on demand data. Thus, the testable implication of the bound
on the Nakamura number of a CMU will guarantee nonempty demand correspondences
whenever k ≥ L since completeness is not testable in finite data. We begin by introducing
the axiom of k-acyclicity:
Axiom 5. (k-acyclicity) For a fixed integer k ≥ 2 there is no chain (x1 , x2 , · · · , xk ) with
elements on X such that x1 R,D x2 R,D · · · R,D xk and xk R,D x1 .
The axiom k-acyclicity is a simplified version of GARP and checks that there are
no cycles of length k in the data (GARP checks for cycles of any length up to T ).
k-acyclicity can be implemented using a simplified version of Warshall’s algorithm to
calculate transitive closures of binary relations and runs in polynomial time.24 The
following theorem gives our characterization:
Theorem 4. Consider a finite data set OT = {pt , xt }t∈T and any number k ≥ 2. The
following statements are equivalent:
(i) The data OT can be rationalized by a coherent CMU preference function with

Nakamura number ν ≥ k + 1 (which in particular is asymmetric, continuous,
monotonic, and piecewise concave).
(ii) The data OT satisfies k-acyclicity.

This result shows that k-acyclicity exhausts the empirical content of a coherent CMU
preference function with Nakamura number ν ≥ k + 1. Thus, to ensure nonemptiness of
the demand correspondence, all one needs to check is that the data OT does not contain
any cycles of length less than the number of goods in the data, L.
24

See Varian (1982) for a discussion of Warshall’s algorithm in the context of revealed preference.
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4.1.c. A Sufficient Condition for Nonemptiness: Total Coherency in Segments.– Now,
we present a sufficient condition that also guarantees a non-empty demand correspondence
under WGARP. This condition is new to the literature and exploits the structure of linear
budget sets. We also connect this condition with the convexity of preferences, used in the
literature to guarantee nonemptiness of the demand correspondence without transitivity
Shafer (1974).
Denote by u|[a,b] the restriction of a piecemeal utility u ∈ U for any U ∈ Ω on a closed
segment of points [a, b] ⊆ X, i.e., on the set of bundles ta + (1 − t)b for a, b ∈ X and
for any t ∈ [0, 1]. Denote the set of [a, b]-restricted utilities corresponding to any U ∈ Ω
as U[a,b] . If two different utilities, u and v, have the same restriction in [a, b], such that
u[a,b] = v[a,b] , we eliminate duplicates and refer to this equivalence class representative as
u[a,b] . We define total coherency in segments as follows:
Definition 15. (Total coherency in segments) A coherent CMU preference function r
satisfies total coherency in segments if for all a, b ∈ X, there is a u|[a,b] in the intersection
taken over U ∈ Ω of all U |[a,b] , i.e., ∩U ∈Ω U |[a,b] 6= ∅.
The next result formally states that a coherent CMU preference function satisfying
total coherency in segments always generates a nonempty demand:
Theorem 5. If a coherent and complete CMU preference function satisfies total coherency
in segments, then the demand correspondence is nonempty-valued for all p ∈ P and w > 0.
This result highlights the local rationality nature of the coherent CMU model. To
guarantee a nonempty-valued demand correspondence, we require that there is a point of
agreement of all coalitions of utilities in Ω when restricted to any closed segment [a, b].
This restriction means that irrespective of the criterion that the consumer considers, there
is always a utility that ranks all points in the interval [a, b] in the same way. Note that
the Nakamura number of a CMU that satisfies total coherency in segments does not need
to be ∞ because the shared common utility in a segment [a, b] may not be the same in
another segment [c, d].
The next result shows that total coherency in segments, is a weaker condition than
the convexity of preferences:
Lemma 5. If the CMU preference function is complete and quasiconcave, then it satisfies
total coherency in segments.
This result follows directly from Proposition 1 in Moldau (1996), showing that completeness and quasiconcavity of preference functions imply that the binary preferences
represented by r are transitive in any closed segment [a, b] for all a, b ∈ X. This result
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means that this property is implied by the restrictions of completeness and convexity of
preferences imposed in the classical work of Shafer (1974) and Sonnenschein (1971) to
guarantee nonemptiness of a demand correspondence without transitivity.
Remark 1. One can construct examples that satisfy total coherency in segments and
violate quasiconcavity. While having specific functional forms would be challenging; the
example would be facilitated by observing that, for our purposes, the total agreement of
preferences on intervals [a, b] can be restricted to budget segments, i.e., for L = 2, segments
where a = (a1 , 0)0 , b = (0, b2 )0 . Moreover, if one were to relax the assumption of concave
piecemeal utilities, examples would be much easier to construct, simply by having a single
utility in the intersection of all collections of utilities with an indifference map consisting
of wavy curves.
Remark 2. We can state the sufficient conditions in Theorem 5 in terms of the underlying
preference relation. The condition implies that the restriction of preferences to the closed
interval [a, b] is complete and transitive. Evidently, this condition is weaker than (global)
completeness and transitivity, as violations of transitivity may occur across distinct closed
intervals.

4.2. Some Basic Textbook Material of Consumer Theory and WGARP
We include in this subsection three remarks of relevance to the basic textbook material
of consumer theory:
Remark 3. It is easy to show that if the observed data set satisfies WGARP, then the
demand correspondence generated from the rationalizing preference function is homogeneous
of degree zero and satisfies the compensated law of demand. The proof trivially follows
from Theorems 1 and A125 –the latter in Section 6–and the fact that optimizing a CMU
preference function over the budget set B(p, w) is equivalent to optimizing the same
preference function over B(αp, αw) for any α > 0.26 Note that John (1995) established
that WARP implies homogeneity of degree zero, but our results also cover the case of
demand correspondences under WGARP.27
Remark 4. The CMU is also convenient when we want to formulate the expenditure
minimization problem for the nontransitive consumer. The consumer’s expenditure function is e(p, u) = minx∈X px subject to maxU ∈Ω minu∈U (u(x) − u) ≥ 0. By continuity, this
25

Theorem A1 is in the Online Appendix.

26

If the demand correspondence is also differentiable, then it is straightforward to show that its Slutsky
matrix S(p, w) is negative semidefinite for all (p, w), p ∈ P, w > 0.
27

John’s (1995) proof is geometric and does not rely on a representation of WARP.
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constraint holds with equality, i.e., e(p, u) = minx∈X px subject to maxU ∈Ω minu∈U (u(x) −
u) = 0. Note that for any x∗ ∈ arg minx∈X px subject to maxU ∈Ω minu∈U (u(x) − u) = 0,
we have u(x∗ ) ≥ u for some U ∈ Ω and all u ∈ U . In this sense, the CMU consumer
always obtains a guaranteed level of “utility” u. These solutions to the expenditure minimization problem comprise the Hicksian demand correspondence h(p, u) = x∗ , such that
the compensated law of demand holds: (p0 − p)(h(p0 , u) − h(p, u)) ≤ 0.
Remark 5. The CMU is useful for its piecewise concavity when we want to analyze or
numerically solve the consumer’s preference-function maximization problem. In particular,
if we assume that every piecemeal utility is differentiable, then a maximizer xt at prices pt
is such that r(xt , y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ X whenever w ≥ pt y. By asymmetry, we know that
r(y, xt ) ≤ 0 for all y such that w ≥ pt y. This means that xt is the solution to the preference
maximization problem, i.e., xt ∈ arg maxy r(y, xt ) + λ(pt y − w). The superdifferential
of the CMU with locally differentiable and concave utilities can be computed following
Tsevendorj (2001) and known facts about concave functions:
!
t

\

∂1 r(x, x ) =

Co

U ∈Ω:r(x,xt )=minu∈U (u(x)−u(xt ))

[

t

t

{∂u(x)|u(x) − u(x ) = min(u(x) − u(x ))} .

u∈U

u∈U

Hence, the supergradient of the CMU is the intersection across all active coalitions of the
convex hull (Co) of the union of the gradients of the active piecemeal utility functions.
Given this, the first-order conditions of the maximization problem above, assuming, without
loss of generality, interiority and that ∂1 r(xt , xt ) is a singleton, are:28
∂1 r(xt , xt ) = λpt .
It directly follows that total coherency in segments guarantees that the supergradient of
the CMU is nonempty. Schofield (1984) also demonstrate that nonemptiness of demand
is roughly equivalent to the nonemptiness of the gradient under (quasi)concavity of the
piecemeal utilities. When this gradient exists at a point, CMU preferences are locally
acyclic Schofield (1984).

4.3. Examples
We conclude this section by illustrating WGARP in light of the CMU model, with the
following examples:
28
With some technicalities these first-order conditions are not only necessary, but also sufficient
(Tsevendorj 2001).
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Example 3. Consider L = 2 goods, hamburger (x1 ) and salad (x2 ). Suppose that the
consumer’s preferences consist of two attributes, health (h) and tastiness (t). The set
of tasty utilities Ut has two elements, ut1 (x) = βx1 + x2 and ut2 (x) = x1 + x2 . The set
of healthy utilities Uh also has two elements, uh1 = βx1 + x2 , and uh2 = x1 + x2 , where
β > 1 > β. The utilities uh2 = ut2 are the same, making the set Ω = {Uh , Ut } coherent.
The CMU preference function has a closed-form solution:
r(x, y) = (x1 + x2 ) − (y1 + y2 ).
In this example, behavior is not only consistent with WGARP but also rational
(consistent with GARP as L = 2) because the consumer endogenously decides to focus on
both attributes to make her decision.
The next example illustrates a more complicated solution, where attributes are interpreted as consumer moods. It describes a situation where a threshold consumption level
of some commodities may become a breaking point that triggers different moods.
Example 4. Consider L = 3 goods, such that x1 , x2 , x3 represent consumption of vegetables, chocolate, and meat, respectively. Suppose there are three moods Ω = {Uh , Us , Uf },
where h stands for hedonistic, s for stoic, and f for flexible. The utilities for the hedonistic
mood are uh,α (x) = 0.5x1 + αx2 + (1 − α)x3 for α ∈ {0.5, 0.6, 0.7}. The utilities for the
stoic mood are us,β (x) = βx1 + 0.5x2 + (1 − β)x3 for β ∈ {0.5, 0.6, 0.7}. The utilities
for the flexible mood are uf,1 = 0.5x1 + 0.6x2 + 0.4x3 and uf,2 = 0.6x1 + 0.5x2 + 0.4x3 .
This CMU satisfies coherence.29 Now, we show that this CMU produces a violation of
transitivity. Consider the bundles x1 = (0, 20, 0)0 , x2 = (0, 10, 10)0 and x3 = (20, 0, 0)0 .
Direct calculations show that r(x1 , x2 ) = 1, while r(x2 , x3 ) = 0 and r(x3 , x1 ) = 0. However, the CMU is asymmetric (as well as continuous, monotone, and piecewise concave).
The violation of transitivity is driven by the fact that different moods are active in
each pairwise comparison. In fact, when comparing x1 to x2 , Uf is active such that
r(x1 , x2 ) = min(uf,1 (x1 ) − uf,1 (x2 ), uf,2 (x1 ) − uf,2 (x2 )). Similarly, when comparing x2 to
x3 , Uh is active; and when comparing x3 to x1 , Us is active. Note that the CMU exhibits
an endogenous mood switching behavior that depends on which pair of bundles is being
compared.
Our last example connects our work with the recent models of Hara et al. (2019) and
Frick et al. (2019).
29
Indeed, Uh ∩ Us = uh,0.5 and uh,0.5 = us,0.5 , and moreover, for Uf we have uf,1 = uh,0.6 and
uf,2 = us,0.6 .
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Example 5. Consider a case where there is one physical good (money) and 3 states of the
world (good, business-as-usual, bad). The Arrow-Debreu state-contingent securities are xl ,
for l = 1, 2, 3. Suppose that the consumer knows that state 1 happens with probability 1/2,
and state 2 or 3 happens with probability 1/2, but there is uncertainty about which of these
two will occur. The consumer has two moods, Ur = {u1,r , u2,r } and Um = {u1,m , u2,m },
where r stands for realistic and m for pessimistic. The utility of an Arrow-Debreu security
x associated with the different utilities i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {r, m} is:
ui,j = 1/2v(x1 ) + (1/2 − πi,j )v(x2 ) + πi,j v(x3 ) = Eπi,j [v(x)],
where 0 ≤ πi,j ≤ 1/2 and v is a Bernoulli utility defined over money. The subjective
probabilities are: π1,r = 1/5, π1,m = 1/3, and π2,r = π2,m = 1/4. Note that this model is
similar to the ambiguity framework posed in Frick et al. (2019), where the “act” corresponds
to choosing bundle x over bundle y, such that the utility of such “act” is given by:
r(x, y) = max min (Eπi,j (v(x) − v(y))).
j∈{r,m} i∈{1,2}

5. Welfare Analysis and Recoverability of Preferences
The fact that convexity of preferences may fail for the coherent CMU implies that
the methods in Varian (1982) need to be modified if one wishes to recover preferences
consistent with WGARP. In this section, we discuss an approach in which all pairs of
observations are used to provide new bounds on the true preferences. This effort results
in a method to recover preferences that is robust to departures from the transitive or
convexity properties of preferences. We begin by showing that recovering preferences
using WGARP does not follow as a trivial corollary of the original approach proposed
in Varian (1982). Subsequently, we propose an alternative method to recover bounds on
preferences using WGARP.
It is useful to briefly recall the classical approach from Varian (1982), which finds
upper and lower bounds to the true preferences of a consumer implied by her consumption
choices. These are captured by the strict upper contour set of a commodity bundle x
according to the true preference function r:
Definition 16. (Set of strictly better alternatives) We define the set of strictly better
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alternatives than a (possibly unobserved) commodity bundle x ∈ X as:
Ur (x) = {y ∈ X : r(y, x) > 0},
for the true preference function r.
Varian (1982) defines the supporting set of prices for any new commodity bundle
x ∈ X, so that the extended data set, OT ∪ {p, x}, satisfies GARP as:
S(x) = {p ∈ P : OT ∪ {p, x} satisfies GARP}.
Varian then uses the set S(x) to create upper and lower bounds for the set of interest
Ur (x). We need to define two new sets. The revealed worse set is:
RW (x) = {y ∈ X : ∀p ∈ S(x), x R,D
OT ∪{(p,x)} y}
for R,D , defined on the extended data set OT ∪ {(p, x)}. The nonrevealed worse set
N RW (x) is the complement of RW (x). The revealed preferred set is:
RP (x) = {y ∈ X : ∀p ∈ S(y), y R,D
OT ∪{(p,y)} x}.
Varian (1982) shows that, in the case of utility maximization (i.e., r(x, y) = u(x) − u(y)
for some u : X → R and all x, y ∈ X), we have:
RP (x) ⊆ Ur (x) ⊆ N RW (x).
One could be tempted to use the same construction for WGARP by replacing the definition
of the supporting set S(x) with one where the extended data set satisfies WGARP. Of
course, when L = 2, this does not cause any problems since WGARP and GARP are
equivalent in such a case. However, if L > 2, as we show, performing such an exercise is
generally not advisable. In particular, we illustrate this through an example that, in some
cases, yields an uninformative upper bound set N RW (x).
Example 6. Consider again the data set OT and a new observed bundle xT +1 in Example 1.
Given the observed behavior, suppose the goal is to recover the preferences of this consumer
for the new commodity bundle. If one were to use the methods in Varian (1982), it is
necessary to recover all prices pT +1 such that the extended data set O3 ∪ (pT +1 , xT +1 )
satisfies WGARP. However, as shown in Example 1, there is no p ∈ P in the supporting
set. This fact creates a problem if the goal is to recover preferences using Varian (1982)
approach because this method implicitly assumes that there always exists at least one such
28

vector of prices satisfying WGARP.
In this example, Varian’s supporting set is empty, i.e., S(xT +1 ) = ∅. Moreover, it
directly follows that the set Ur (x) may contain any monotonically dominated bundle
such as x− = (1, 1, 1). Consequently, the upper bound of Ur (xT +1 ) is uninformative, i.e.,
N RW (xT +1 ) = X \ xT +1 . Thus, any analysis based on this approach is problematic
since the observed behavior can be rationalized by a preference function that is strictly
increasing (in the first argument). In other words, Varian’s method to bound preferences
does not provide any valuable information in Example 6. We can trace the source of this
failure to a violation of the convexity of preferences. Summarizing these results, the lack
of convexity of preferences, which can be inferred from behavior consistent with WGARP,
limits the applicability of the tools developed in the classical treatment by Varian (1982).
In the rest of the section, we use the new notion of CMU preference rationalization as
a way to provide new informative bounds on the true preferences. We show that these
new bounds escape the problems associated with Varian’s approach.
The proof of Theorem 1 shows that, without loss of generality, we can identify the set
of coalitions of utilities in Ω = ∪t∈T Ut with the set of observations T (i.e., uts ∈ Ut is the
2 30
Afriat utility for the data set Ost
). Then, the true global preferences for any x0 , x ∈ X

are given by:
r(x0 , x) = max min(u(x0 ) − u(x)).
Ut :t∈T u∈Ut

The proof also shows that any data set OT satisfying WGARP can be broken down into T 2
2
pairwise data sets Ost
= {(pt , xt ), (ps , xs )}, and we argue that each one of these pairwise

data sets satisfy GARP. For any pair of observations s, t ∈ T, we define the local support
set Sst (x) for any x ∈ X as in Varian (1982). Hence, for a data set of T observations, we
have a collection of T 2 such local support sets. Note, by definition, that every one of these
sets is nonempty. We follow a similar logic to that in Varian’s approach, but in trying to
construct the revealed preferred set to a given bundle, we do it “in chunks” based on each
pair of observations (s, t). Thus, consider the following two definitions:
Definition 17. (WGARP-robust revealed preferred set) For each s, t ∈ T let
RPst (x) = {y ∈ X : ∀p ∈ Sst (y), py > px}
be the pairwise revealed preferred set. We define the (WGARP-)robust revealed preferred
set as:
RP W (x) = ∪s∈T ∩t∈T RPst (x).
30

Indeed, there is a “canonical” set of attributes, which can be identified with T. Within the attribute
corresponding to observation xt , there are utility functions uts for all s, where the preference on attribute
t can be colored by any pairwise comparison. Coherency is attained by having uts = ust .
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That is, fixing observation s, we take the intersection over all observations t because
we want to be confident that the “revealed preferred” relation holds for every pair (s, t).
Then, we take the union over all s to define the robust revealed preferred set.
Next, we argue that the robust revealed preferred set is a lower bound of Ur (x) for all
x ∈ X. If x0 ∈ RP W (x), this implies x0 ∈ RPst (x) for all t ∈ T and for some s∗ ∈ T. Thus,
it must be the case that, for s∗ and for all t ∈ T, the Afriat utilities of the data set Os2∗ t
are such that us∗ t (x0 ) > us∗ t (x), which means that r(x0 , x) ≥ minu∈Us∗ (u(x0 ) − u(x)) > 0.
Hence, if x0 ∈ RP W (x), then we have r(x0 , x) > 0, which can be equivalently stated as:
RP W (x) ⊆ Ur (x).
Definition 18. (WGARP-robust (non)revealed worse set) For each s, t ∈ T, let
RWst (x) = {y ∈ X : ∀p ∈ Sst (x), px > py}
be the pairwise revealed worse set. Let N RWst (x) be the complement of RWst (x). Define
the (WGARP-)robust nonrevealed worse set as
N RW W (x) = ∩s∈T ∪t∈T N RWst (x).
From this definition, it directly follows that, if r(x0 , x) > 0, then x0 ∈ N RW W (x). In
particular, note that, if r(x0 , x) > 0, then there must be some t∗ ∈ T (Ut∗ ) such that
u(x0 ) > u(x) for all u ∈ Ut∗ . By a direct application of the results in Varian (1982), we
have x0 ∈ N RWst∗ (x) for all s ∈ T. Then, by Definition 18, it follows that x0 ∈ N RW W (x).
Hence, this proves that Ur (x) ⊆ N RW W (x). The following theorem summarizes these
steps, confirming that the bounds recovered using Varian’s approach in this context are
not sharp:
Theorem 6. The upper contour set Ur (x) of the true preferences at any given x ∈ X is
such that:
RP W (x) ⊆ Ur (x) ⊆ N RW W (x).
Moreover, (i) the upper bound, N RW (x), recovered using Varian’s approach is not sharp,
i.e., N RW W (x) ⊆ N RW (x) for all x ∈ X (with strict containment for some x ∈ X);
and (ii) the lower bound, RP (x), recovered using Varian’s approach is not sharp, i.e.,
RP (x) ⊆ RP W (x) for all x ∈ X (with strict containment for some x ∈ X).
We note that, in the context of Example 6, N RW W (xT +1 ) does not contain the
dominated bundle x− = (1 1 1)0 . In fact, N RW W (xT +1 ) excludes all commodity bundles
that are monotonically dominated by xT +1 , which is a desirable property lacking in
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Varian’s analogous set N RW (xT +1 ) = X \ {xT +1 }. Similar statements can be made about
the RP W (x− ) set.
Thus, the first part of Theorem 6 shows that the new method of using subsets of
data sets to calculate bounds on preferences yields informative bounds. The second
part highlights that a naive application of the methodology in Varian (1982), when the
assumption of convex preferences does not hold, is problematic.

6. Extensions of the Main Results and Discussions
6.1. WARP
In the Online Appendix, we provide a characterization of Samuelson’s (1938) weak
axiom of revealed preference (WARP).31 There, we provide a complete revealed-preference
characterization of WARP. This result mirrors Matzkin and Richter’s (1991) theorem in
terms of strict preference-function rationalization (as opposed to strict utility rationalization).

6.2. The Law of Demand
Following Brown and Calsamiglia (2007) and Allen and Rehbeck (2018), we can
impose restrictions on the piecemeal utilities in the CMU preference function to provide
a representation for choices obeying the law of demand–recall that WARP is essentially
equivalent to its compensated version. This is done in the Online Appendix through a
quasilinear restriction in Theorem A.1. This characterization may be of interest in its
own right, due to the importance of the law of demand in both theoretical and applied
literatures.32
31

Recall from Section 2.1 that WARP holds if there is no pair of observations s, t ∈ T such that
x R,D xs and xs R,D xt , with xt 6= xs .
t
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Specifically, demand functions satisfying the law of demand have downward-sloping demand curves,
and allow the measurement of welfare changes in terms of consumer surplus for a given change in market
prices (Brown and Calsamiglia 2007).
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6.3. Extended Discussion of Related Literature
We extend the discussion of our results with the literature. We go beyond the
connections established in the intro and throughout the manuscript in the Online Appendix.

7. Conclusion
This paper offers Afriat-like theorems for WGARP and WARP. In particular, it shows
that the coherent CMU preference function is equivalent to Samuelson’s WGARP. We
build a comprehensive theory of revealed preference based on the new rationalization. Our
findings should be helpful for practitioners of revealed preference since, from an empirical
perspective, WGARP is significantly more straightforward to work with than Varian’s
GARP. In applications, it is common for practitioners to use WGARP as synonymous with
GARP. However, as shown in Cherchye et al. (2018), this is only true if price variation
is limited.33 For example, a finite data set of prices and observed consumption choices
may be consistent with WGARP, but cannot be rationalized by a utility function. If this
occurs, the interpretation of the direct revealed-preference relation is unclear, yet we show
that meaningful welfare and counterfactual analysis are possible. We leave for future
research the characterization of a coherent CMU that imposes convexity in the implied
preferences.
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For a generalized treatment of when WARP implies rationality, see Caradonna (2018).
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Let r be a coherent CMU function and assume that r(x, y) ≥ 0. By definition,
r(x, y) = maxU ∈Ω minu∈U (u(x) − u(y)) ≥ 0, which means that there exists a Û such that,
for each u ∈ Û , u(x) − u(y) ≥ 0. By coherency, this means that for all U ∈ Ω, there is a
û ∈ U ∩ Û such that û(y) − û(x) ≤ 0. Thus, r(y, x) = maxU ∈Ω minu∈U (u(y) − u(x)) ≤ 0,
which is what we wanted to show. The same argument can be repeated with strict
inequalities, in which case, it follows that if r is a coherent CMU and if r(x, y) > 0 then
r(y, x) < 0.

Proof of Lemma 2
From Theorem 1.a. in Nishimura and Ok (2016), we know that  is reflexive if and only
if x  y ⇐⇒ r(x, y) = supU ∈Ω inf u∈U (u(x)−u(y)) ≥ 0, where Ω is a non-empty collection
of continuous utility functions. Now we will show that if x  y then r(x, y) > 0 where r
is defined above. But this holds since by definition r(x, y) ≥ 0 and r(y, x) < 0, and by
coherency this means that there exist a U ∈ Ω such that inf u∈U (u(x)−u(y)) > 0. Similarly,
if r(x, y) > 0 we can show that x  y. Indeed, r(x, y) > 0 implies that r(y, x) < 0, which
means that x  y and ¬y  x. It remains to show that if  is asymmetric then Ω is
such that for any U, Û ∈ Ω, it must be that U ∩ Û 6= ∅. Assume towards a contradiction
that asymmetry holds and that coherency fails such that for some Û ∈ Ω \ {U } we have
U ∩ Û 6= ∅. This implies that if x  y then for all u ∈ Û it must hold that u(y) > u(x),
and if x  y then for all u ∈ Û it must hold that u(y) ≥ u(x). But the previous statement
is a violation of asymmetry of  and results in a contradiction. Lemma 1 shows that if Ω
is coherent then  is asymmetric by the fact that this representation respects the strict
part of .

Proof of Theorem 1
First, we prove the equivalence of WGARP with the systems of Afriat and Varian inequalities (statements (ii), (iii), and (iv)):
(ii) =⇒ (iii).– Suppose that WGARP holds. For every pair of observations in the data set
2
OT , we let Ost
denote the data set consisting of the two observations s, t ∈ T. Overall, we

33

have T 2 such data sets, which exhausts all possible pairwise comparisons in OT . Obviously,
2
for the two observations in each data set Ots
, WGARP is equivalent to GARP. By a direct

application of Afriat’s theorem, the following conditions are equivalent: (i) the data set
2
Ost
satisfies WGARP, (ii) there exist numbers Utsk and λkts > 0 for all k ∈ {t, s} such that

the Afriat inequalities: Utsk − Utsl ≥ λkts pk (xk − xl ) hold for all k, l ∈ {t, s}. Now, notice
2
2
that the two data sets Ots
and Ost
contain the same two bundles and that permuting

the data is insignificant for Afriat’s theorem. Thus, without loss of generality, we can set
Utsk = Ustk and λkts = λkst for all k ∈ {t, s}. By defining Rt,s = Utst − Utss and Rs,t = Utss − Utst ,
we get the inequalities in condition (iii).
(iii) =⇒ (iv).– Suppose that condition (iii) holds. Since λtts > 0, if pt (xt − xs ) ≥ 0 then
Rt,s ≥ 0, and if pt (xt − xs ) > 0 then Rt,s > 0. Define W t,s = Rt,s for all s, t ∈ T.
(iv) =⇒ (ii).– Suppose that condition (iv) holds, but that WGARP is violated, i.e.,
pt (xt − xs ) ≥ 0 and ps (xs − xt ) > 0 for some s, t ∈ T. Then W t,s ≥ 0 and W s,t > 0, which
violates asymmetry, and hence, condition (iv).Suppose that the inequalities in condition
(iv) holds, but that WGARP is violated, i.e., pt (xt − xs ) ≥ 0 and ps (xs − xt ) > 0 for
some s, t ∈ T. Then W t,s ≥ 0 and W s,t > 0. Thus, W t,s + W s,t > 0, which violates the
inequalities in condition (iv).
Next, we prove the ordinal characterization of WGARP (equivalence of statements (i) and
(ii)):
(i) =⇒ (ii).– Let r(x, y) be a locally nonsatiated asymmetric preference function that
rationalizes the data. Suppose there is a violation of WGARP, so that pt xt ≥ pt xs and
ps xs > ps xt for some pair of observations s, t ∈ T. Then, by rationalization in Definition
8, we have r(xt , xs ) ≥ 0. By asymmetry, r(xs , xt ) ≤ 0.
Also by rationalization, from ps xs > ps xt , we get that r(xs , xt ) ≥ 0. Putting both
together, we get that r(xs , xt ) = 0. But then, by local nonsatiation there exists y ∈ B(xt , )
for some small  > 0 such that ps xs > ps y with r(xs , y) < 0, which contradicts that r
rationalizes the data. Thus, there cannot exist an asymmetric locally nonsatiated function
r rationalizing the data.
(ii) =⇒ (i).– This is a constructive proof. Suppose that WGARP in condition (ii) holds.
2
Once again, for every pair of observations in the data set OT , we let Ost
denote the data

set consisting of the two observations s, t ∈ T. Hence, we have T 2 such data sets, which
exhausts all possible pairwise comparisons in OT . Obviously, for the two observations in
2
each data set Ots
, WGARP is equivalent to GARP. For the two observations in every
2
data set Ost
, we define the Afriat function ust : X → R as in Afriat’s theorem (See e.g.,
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Varian 1982). From Afriat’s theorem, we know that ust is continuous, concave, and strictly
increasing. Next, for all x, y ∈ X, we define the mapping: rst : X × X → R as:
rst (x, y) = ust (x) − ust (y) .
Clearly, rst is continuous in x and y, concave in x, and convex in y (since ust is continuous
and concave). Moreover, it is skew-symmetric, since rst (y, x) = ust (y)−ust (x) = −rst (x, y).
Notice that, since the function rst is constructed for every (s, t)− pair of observations in
OT , we have a collection of T 2 functions rst .
Let the T − 1 dimensional simplex be denoted as ∆ = {λ ∈ RT+ |

PT

t=1

λt = 1}. Define

the preference function r(x, y) for any x, y ∈ X as:
r(x, y) = min max
λ∈∆ µ∈∆

XX

λs µt rst (x, y)

s∈T t∈T

= max min
µ∈∆ λ∈∆

XX

λs µt rst (x, y).

s∈T t∈T

We first prove that the function r rationalizes the data set OT . Consider y ∈ X and some
fixed t ∈ T such that pt xt ≥ pt y. Let µt ∈ ∆ be the vector such that µtj = 0 if j 6= t and
µtj = 1 if j = t. Then we have:
r(xt , y) = max min
µ∈∆ λ∈∆

XX
s∈T t∈T

≥ min

XX

= min

X

λ∈∆

λ∈∆

λs µt rst (xt , y)

λi µtj rij (xt , y)

i∈T j∈T

λi rit (xt , y).

i∈T

It suffices to show that rit (xt , y) ≥ 0 whenever pt xt ≥ pt y for each data set Oit2 . But this
follows directly from the definition of rit and Afriat’s theorem. Hence, r(xt , y) ≥ 0.
Now, we verify that the preference function r constructed is skew-symmetric (and
hence asymmetric) and strictly increasing (and hence locally nonsatiated).
First, we show skew-symmetry. We have:
−r(x, y) = − min max
λ∈∆ µ∈∆

= max min
λ∈∆ µ∈∆

XX

λs µt rst (x, y)

s∈T t∈T

XX

λs µt (−rst (x, y)),

s∈T t∈T

Since rst is skew-symmetric (i.e., −rst (x, y) = rst (y, x)), we have (this follows directly
from the classical von Neumann’s minimax theorem because ∆ is convex and compact,
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and the sum is linear in λ and µ):
−r(x, y) = max min
λ∈∆ µ∈∆

= max min
λ∈∆ µ∈∆

= min max
µ∈∆ λ∈∆

XX

λs µt (−rst (x, y))

s∈T t∈T

XX

λs µt rst (y, x)

s∈T t∈T

XX

λs µt rst (y, x)

s∈T t∈T

= r(y, x),
which proves that r is skew-symmetric.
And next, we show that r is strictly increasing. Consider any x, y, z ∈ X such that
x > y. Then:
rst (x, z) = ust (x) − ust (z)
> ust (y) − ust (z)
= rst (y, z),
where ust (x) > ust (y) follows by Afriat’s theorem. This implies:
max
µ∈∆

XX

λs µt rst (x, z) > max
µ∈∆

s∈T t∈T

XX

λs µt rst (y, z),

s∈T t∈T

for all λ ∈ ∆. Thus, r(x, z) > r(y, z).
And finally, we show the cardinal representation of WGARP by means of a coherent CMU
function (equivalence of statements (ii) and (v)):
(v) =⇒ (ii).– Let r be a coherent CMU preference function that rationalizes the data. By
Lemma 1, r is asymmetric. Suppose there is a violation of WGARP, so that pt xt ≥ pt xs
and ps xs > ps xt for some pair of observations s, t ∈ T. Then, by rationalization in
Definition 8, we have r(xt , xs ) ≥ 0 and r(xs , xt ) ≥ 0. We have two possible cases. Suppose
first that r(xs , xt ) > 0. This leads to a contradiction because by asymmetry r(xs , xt ) ≤ 0.
So, suppose next that r(xs , xt ) = 0, which means that for all U ∈ Ω, there exists u ∈ U
such that u(xs ) − u(xt ) ≤ 0. But there exists y ∈ B(xt , ) for some small  > 0 such that
y >> xt , and ps xs > ps y. This means that for all U ∈ Ω, there exists u ∈ U such that
u(xs ) − u(y) < 0. Then, r(xs , y) < 0, which contradicts that r rationalizes the data, so
this case is also impossible.
(ii) =⇒ (v).– This is again a constructive proof. Suppose that WGARP holds. Consider
2
once again the data set Ots
, and recall that we have T 2 such data sets, which exhausts all
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possible pairwise comparisons in the data set OT . Again, for the two observations in every
2
data set Ost
, we define the Afriat function ust : X → R (Recall that ust is continuous,

concave, and strictly increasing).
Next, we define the set of utility functions as Ut = ∪s∈T {uts }, and the family of sets
of utility functions as ΩT = ∪t∈T Ut . It is trivial to verify that Ut is compact (finite and
discrete) and that Ω also is finite and discrete. We begin by verifying that ΩT satisfies
coherency. Indeed, Ut ∩ Us = {uts } = {ust }. Coherency follows since uts = ust by Afriat’s
theorem.
Next, we define the coherent CMU preference function as:
r(x, y) = max min(u(x) − u(y)).
U ∈ΩT u∈U

We prove that the function r rationalizes the data set OT . Consider y ∈ X and some
fixed t ∈ T such that pt xt ≥ pt y. We have:
r(xt , y) = max min(u(xt ) − u(y))
U ∈ΩT u∈U

≥ min(u(xt ) − u(y)).
u∈U

It suffices to show that u(xt ) − u(y) ≥ 0 whenever pt xt ≥ pt y for each Ut ∈ ΩT . But this
follows directly from the definition of Ut and Afriat’s theorem. Hence, r(xt , y) ≥ 0.

Proof of Theorem 2
(i) =⇒ (ii).– If x R y, then x ∈ c(A) and y ∈ A for some A ∈ A. This means
that there is a CMU preference function such that r(x, y) ≥ 0. This is equivalent to
saying that there is one U ∗ ∈ Ω such that inf u∈U ∗ (u(x) − u(y)) ≥ 0. Assume towards a
contradiction that y R x. This means that there is a set a B ∈ A and z ∈ B where
{y, x, z} ⊆ B, y ∈ c(B) and z > x. If y ∈ c(B) then there is a coalition U ∗∗ ∈ Ω such
that inf u∈U ∗∗ (u(y) − u(x)) ≥ 0. The first case corresponds to inf u∈U ∗∗ (u(y) − u(x)) > 0,
which is a contradiction of coherency as this implies that U ∗∗ ∩ U ∗ = ∅. The second case
is inf u∈U ∗∗ (u(y) − u(x)) = 0, but in such a case we know that there exists a z ∈ B such
that for all u ∈ U ∗∗ u(z) > u(x). This means that inf u∈U ∗∗ (u(y) − u(z)) < 0. But this is
a contradiction to the fact that the CMU rationalizes the data set D.
(ii) =⇒ (i).– First, we need some preliminary results:
Theorem C. (Chambers and Echenique 2016; Theorem 2.19) Suppose that the acyclic
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order pair (≥, >) satisfies: x > y ≥ z implies x > z, that all A ∈ A are comprehensive,
and X is (≥, >)-dense separable. Then there exists a utility function which is monotone
with respect to (≥, >) and that rationalizes the data set D if and only if (R , R ) satisfies
the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP).
Lemma 6. If D satisfies WGARP and all menus are comprehensive then D is rationalized
by a general coherent CMU preference function.
Step 1 : Define X̃ = ∪A∈A A as the set of observed alternatives. Take x, y ∈ X̃ and
construct the direct preference relation constrained to {x, y} as R |{x, y}. By WGARP
R
we know that the restriction R
x,y = |{x, y} is acyclic (i.e., satisfies GARP).
R
Step 2 : Take R
x,y from Step 1 and add the following elements to this relation: x x,y z
R
R
R
if x R z , and x R
x,y z if x  z for all z ∈ X̃. Moreover, to x,y we add: y x,y z if
R
y R z and y R
x,y z if y  z.
R
Step 3 : We show that the order-pair (R
x,y , x,y ) constructed in Step 2 is acyclic, i.e.,
2
n−1
n
n
R
1
satisfies GARP. Assume not, then x1 R
R
x,y x , · · · , x
x,y x and x x,y x . Without

loss of generality assume that x R
x,y y, in which case every element of this chain must
k
R
r
R
k
involve y R
x,t x or x x,t x . But then every chain has a sub chain x x,y x and
R
k
k
R
xk R
x,y x; or y x,y x and x x,y x. But this cannot hold because it implies that
R
R
xk R
x,y x. Hence, WGARP is violated by the construction of (x,y , x,y ) in Step 2.

Step 4 : By Theorem C above and that we obtain a utility function ux,y that is
R
R
monotone on (≥, >) and extends the order-pair (R
x,y , x,y ) to X, we have that if x x,y y

then ux,y (x) ≥ ux,y (y) (and x R
x,y y then ux,y (x) > ux,y (y)). Without loss of generality,
we let ux,y = uy,x (this has to be set for the elements x, y ∈ X̃ that are not ranked).
Step 5 : Define Ux = {u| ux,y ∃y ∈ X̃}.
Now we show that the CMU with Ω = {U | Ux ∃x ∈ X̃} rationalizes the data set:
Step 6 : Fix an x such that x ∈ c(A) for some A ∈ A. Then by Step 3, x x,y b for all
b ∈ A and all y ∈ X̃. By the definition of Ux , we have inf u∈Ux (u(x)−u(b)) ≥ 0 for all b ∈ A.
This implies r(x, b) ≥ 0 for all b ∈ A, which means that x ∈ {a ∈ A | r(a, b) ≥ 0 ∀ b ∈ A}.
We conclude that the constructed CMU is coherent, because, by construction, there is
always an element ux,y ∈ Ux ∩ Uy . In addition, the piecemeal utilities are monotone with
respect to the order-pair (≥, >) by Theorem A.

Proof of Lemma 3
Consider the data set O3 with prices p1 = (4 1 5)0 , p2 = (5 4 1)0 , and p3 = (1 5 4)0 , and
bundles x1 = (4 1 1)0 , x2 = (1 4 1)0 , x3 = (1 1 4)0 . This data set satisfies WGARP. Notice
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that pt xt = 22 for all t = 1, 2, 3. Define the out-of-sample price: pT +1 =

22 1
(p
k

+ p2 + p 3 )

for some k ≥ 60, and the income level wT +1 = pT +1 xT +1 = 22. Then we have:
pT +1 =

220
(1 1 1)0 ,
k

(xT1 +1 + xT2 +1 + xT3 +1 ) =

k
.
10

More important, we observe that:
22 = pT +1 xT +1 ≥ pT +1 xt =

22 · 60
.
k

Assume towards contradiction that xT +1 is in D(pT +1 , wT +1 ), then it must be that,
pt xt < pt xT +1 for t = 1, 2, 3. Adding up inequalities we obtain, 66 = (p1 x1 +p2 x2 +p3 x3 ) <
10(xT1 +1 + xT2 +1 + xT3 +1 ) = k. This produces a contradiction whenever 60 ≤ k < 66 for
WGARP, and WARP. There is a continuum of examples.

Proof of Theorem 3
First, notice that due to local nonsatiation of the coherent CMU, r given p and w > 0
we can focus on a compact and convex choice set of dimension L − 1, W ⊆ RL−1 , that will
contain the maximizer of rconstrained to B(p, w). This choice set is the budget constraint
boundary.
Note that each piecemeal utility is assumed to be continuous and concave. Also,
ν − 1 > L implies that ν − 2 ≥ L − 1. This means that all assumptions in Theorem 4 in
Schofield (1984) are satisfied for the case of a finite number of piecemeal utilities.
Note that the same proof of Theorem 4 in Schofield (1984) works for the case of
compact coalitions of piecemeal utilities (possibly an infinite number of them), when
we replace the finite version of the Helly’s theorem used in the proof of Theorem 4 in
Schofield (1984), for the infinite version of Helly’s theorem in Eckhoff (1993).
Therefore, Theorem 4 in Schofield (1984) allows us to conclude that there is an x ∈ W
such that there is no y ∈ W such that r(y, x) > 0, this means that r(y, x) ≤ 0 for all
y ∈ W . Invoking completeness and asymmetry of the CMU we conclude that r(y, x) ≥ 0
for all y ∈ W .
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Proof of Theorem 4
(i) =⇒ (ii).– Fix k and let r be a coherent CMU preference function with Nakamura
number ν ≥ k + 1 that rationalizes the data OT . Suppose towards contradiction that the
data OT violates of k-acyclicity. Then there is a chain (x1 , x2 , · · · , xk ) with elements on
X such that x1 R,D x2 R,D · · · R,D xk and xk R,D x1 . Then by rationalization in
Definition 8, we have r(x1 , x2 ) ≥ 0, . . . , r(x2 , x3 ) ≥ 0, . . . , r(xk−1 , xk ) ≥ 0, but r(xk , x1 ) ≥
0. There are two cases. First, r(xk , x1 ) > 0. But this is a contradiction since there is
a U ∗ ∈ Ω such that for all u ∈ U ∗ , u(xk ) − u(x1 ) > 0. Indeed, we have coalitions Us
such that for all u ∈ Us and all s = {1, · · · , k − 1}, u(xs ) − u(xs+1 ) ≥ 0. Since ν ≥ k + 1
this means that ∩s∈{1,··· ,k−1} Us ∩ U ∗ =
6 ∅. But this is a contradiction because this implies
the existence of a u ∈ ∩s∈{1,··· ,k−1} Us ∩ U ∗ such that u(x1 ) ≥ u(xk ) > u(x1 ), which is
impossible.
Second, r(xk , x1 ) = 0, which means that for all U ∈ Ω, there exists u ∈ U such that
u(xk ) − u(x1 ) ≤ 0. But there exists y ∈ B(x1 , ) for some small  > 0 such that y >> x1 ,
and pk xk > pk y (because by assumption pk xk > pk x1 ). This means that for all U ∈ Ω,
there exists u ∈ U such that u(xk ) − u(y) < 0. Then, r(xk , y) < 0, which contradicts that
r rationalizes the data, so this case is also impossible.
k
(ii) =⇒ (i).– We begin by constructing datasets Ot,s,···
,w of size k ≥ 2. For these k
k
observations k-acyclicity implies that GARP holds on Ot,s,···
,w . Then, using Afriat’s

theorem we define the utility function ut,s,··· ,w : X → R (recall that ut,s,··· ,w is continuous,
concave, and strictly increasing).
Next, we define the set of utility functions as Ut = ∪s∈T · · · ∪w∈T {ut,s,··· ,w } and the
family of sets of utility functions as ΩT = ∪t∈T Ut . It is trivial to verify that Ut is compact
(finite and discrete).
Next, we verify that the Nakamura number associated with ΩT is ν ≥ k + 1. Indeed,
∩t0 ∈{t,s,··· ,w} Ut0 = {ut,s,··· ,w } for all sequences {t, s, · · · , w} of size k. This is true because
k
Afriat’s theorem produces the same utility for any permutation of the subdataset Ot,s,···
,w .

Hence, ν ≥ k + 1.
Define the coherent CMU preference function as:
r(x, y) = max min(u(x) − u(y)).
U ∈ΩT u∈U

Finally, we prove that the function r rationalizes the data set OT . Consider y ∈ X and
some fixed t ∈ T such that pt xt ≥ pt y. We have:
r(xt , y) = max min(u(xt ) − u(y))
U ∈ΩT u∈U
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≥ min(u(xt ) − u(y)).
u∈U

It suffices to show that u(xt ) − u(y) ≥ 0 whenever pt xt ≥ pt y for each Ut ∈ ΩT . But this
follows directly from the definition of Ut and Afriat’s theorem. Hence, r(xt , y) ≥ 0.

Proof of Theorem 5
The existence of u|[a,b] in the intersection of all U |[a,b] , means that the restriction of the
preference function r to [a, b], denoted by r[a,b] , represents a complete order on [a, b] that
only allows for weak cycles. Formally, r|[a,b] allows only for weak cycles if and only if, for
x1 , x2 , · · · , xn ∈ [a, b], we have that r|[a,b] (x1 , x2 ) ≥ r|[a,b] (x2 , x3 ) ≥ · · · ≥ r|[a,b] (xn−1 , xn ) ≥
0 does not imply r|[a,b] (xn , x1 ) > 0. To see this is true, notice that the existence of a
u|[a,b] in the intersection of all U |[a,b] means that u|[a,b] (x1 ) ≥ u|[a,b] (x2 ) ≥ · · · ≥ u|[a,b] (xn )
implies, for all U |[a,b] , that there is a u|[a,b] such that u|[a,b] (xn ) − u|[a,b] (x1 ) ≤ 0. This, in
turn, implies r|[a,b] (xn , x1 ) ≤ 0. Because r is a complete, monotone and coherent CMU, the
order r[a,b] is complete, continuous and strictly monotone, and moreover, it is transitive.
To see the latter, note that for x, y, z ∈ [a, b], if r[a,b] (x, y) ≥ 0 and r[a,b] (y, z) ≥ 0 then by
completeness either r[a,b] (x, z) ≥ 0 or r[a,b] (z, x) ≥ 0 holds, but by weak cycles, it can only
be that r[a,b] (x, z) ≥ 0 holds. Finally, we apply Theorem 2 in Moldau (1996) to conclude
that for all (p, w), p ∈ P and w > 0, there exists a x ∈ B(p, w) for any complete and
coherent CMU such that [maxU ∈Ω minu∈U (u(x) − u(y))] ≥ 0 for all y ∈ B(p, w).

Proof of Theorem 6
The proof of the first part of the theorem follows from the discussion before the
statement of the theorem. We prove the second part. Since RWst (x) ⊇ RW (x), we
have that N RWst (x) ⊆ N RW (x). Thus, by construction N RW W (x) ⊆ N RW (x). We
are going to show that N RW w (x) ⊂ N RW (x) for some x ∈ X. We will do this in the
context of Example 1. Clearly, the bundle x− = (1 1 1)0 is monotonically dominated by
xT +1 . First, note that the upper bound using Varian’s method contains this dominated
option, i.e., x− ∈ N RW (x) = X \ {xT +1 }. Second, note that for all s, t ∈ T and by strict
monotonicity, we must have ust (xT +1 ) > ust (x− ) (this follows by Afriat’s theorem applied
2
to the data Ost
). This implies that x− ∈
/ N RWst (xT +1 ) for all t, s ∈ T. It also follows

that RP (w) ⊆ RP W (x), since RP (x) ⊆ RPst (x) holds for all s, t ∈ T.
Consider again, in the context of Example 1, the bundle x− = (1 1 1)0 . We are going
to show that xT +1 = (2 2 2)0 is not in RP (x− ), but that it is in RP W (x− ). From Example
41

1, we know that S(xT +1 ) = ∅, which implies xT +1 ∈
/ RP (x− ). However, we also have that
p(xT +1 − x− ) > 0 for all p ∈ P , which means that for the rationalizing piecemeal utility
function, we have ust (xT +1 ) > ust (x− ) for all s, t ∈ T. This means that xT +1 ∈ RPst (x− )
for all s, t ∈ T. Hence, xT +1 ∈ RP W (x− ).
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A. Extended Discussion of Related Literature
In this section, we extend our discussion of the relationship with previous works. Afriat
(1967) and Varian (1982) show that the classical notion of rationality is equivalent to the
Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). In the current study, we show that
a data set that satisfies WGARP, but perhaps not GARP, is consistent with a weaker
notion of rationalization. Of course, classical utility maximization is a special case, when
there is a (global) utility function u that is capable of rationalizing the data set OT , in
which case there exists a utility function u such that r(x, y) = u(x) − u(y) for all x, y ∈ X.
Our results for the consumer setting are derived under the assumption that the
researcher only observes a finite number of choices. In the original formulation of revealedpreference theory (Samuelson 1938 and Houthakker 1950), it is implicitly assumed that
∗

Department of Economics, The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada,

vaguiar@uwo.ca.
†

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm, Sweden, per.hjertstrand@ifn.se.

‡

Department

of

Economics,

Brown

University,

roberto_serrano@brown.edu.

1

Providence,

Rhode

Island,

U.S.A.,

the entire demand function, or a demand correspondence, is observed. We provide a
characterization for the abstract setting which covers finite and infinite data sets, and
also nonlinear budgets.1
The closest works to our paper are Kim and Richter (1986) and Quah (2006). Both
works provide rationalizations of demand correspondences, or functions, consistent with
WGARP or WARP, using additional conditions on the invertibility of demand, where
preferences are assumed convex (in a certain sense).2 Our paper generalizes these contributions by (i) providing a rationalization of WGARP/WARP for finite data sets, and (ii)
relaxing the invertibility requirement for every commodity bundle in X.3
Preference functions with the skew-symmetry property were introduced by Shafer
(1974). We show that rationalization by the weaker notion of asymmetric preference
functions is essentially equivalent to WGARP; the proof of Theorem 1 also reveals
that WGARP implies that one can always find a skew-symmetric preference-function
rationalization. Moreover, we also show that WGARP is equivalent to rationalization by
a new kind of preference function, the CMU preference function, and our results answer in
the negative the conjecture posed in Kihlstrom et al. (1976), concerning the equivalence
between Shafer’s skew-symmetric preference functions and WGARP.4
Krauss (1985) provides a representation of 2-monotone operators (effectively equivalent
to the law of demand), by means of a skew-symmetric preference function. To our
knowledge, our results regarding WGARP are new in the mathematical literature on
monotone operators as well, extending the contribution of Krauss (1985) to 2-cyclical
consistent operators (effectively equivalent to WGARP). We also provide an extension
for the original representation of the law of demand, connecting it with CMU quasilinear
rationalization, as in Brown and Calsamiglia (2007), as well as covering the case of
limited data sets. John (2001) studies a generalization of the law of demand that allows
weights. This condition is stronger than WGARP. He provides a revealed-preference
characterization of this condition, and establishes the equivalence of the weighted law
1

The only other work we are aware of that has provided a revealed-preference characterization of
nontransitive consumers in abstract settings is Dziewulski (2021).
2

The notions of convexity of preferences in Kim-Richter and Quah are strictly weaker than standard
convexity of preferences.
3

Mariotti (2008) provides a study of WGARP in abstract environments with complete data sets (all
choice sets are observed), and shows that WARP is equivalent to the maximization (in a new sense that
he calls justified, of a binary preference relation that is asymmetric). Mariotti (2008) does not provide a
representation theorem for WGARP nor does he deal with limited data sets.
4

The main result in Kihlstrom et al. (1976) shows that if the demand function is differentiable and
satisfies WGARP at every point in its domain, then the Slutsky substitution matrix derived from the
demand function is negative semidefinite at every point.
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of demand and a special case of Shafer’s (1974) preference function that is concave in
the first argument. The weighted law of demand condition is cardinal and cannot be
translated to abstract settings.
Some papers have extended the Varian (1982) method to recover preferences to different
types of consumer demand models. Two notable examples are, Blundell et al. (2003, 2008)
which show that it is possible to substantially enhance recovery and prediction results
by combining revealed-preference theory with nonparametric estimation of Engel curves.
However, their analysis is based on WARP, which we have shown may be problematic in
a setup with more than two goods (Blundell et al. (2003) considers 22 goods and Blundell
et al. (2008) uses three goods in their empirical applications). Blundell et al. (2015) shows
how the methods in Blundell et al. (2003, 2008) can be modified to derive sharp bounds
on welfare measures under SARP (i.e., global rationality).
Finally, Halevy et al. (2017) shows that Varian’s method to recover preferences under
GARP does not apply to nonconvex preferences, and suggests an alternative method based
on monotonicity. However, when GARP holds, concavity is not a testable restriction.
Our analysis provides a different solution based on piecewise concavity, which, being an
alternative to monotonicity, is also robust to the possible lack of convexity of preferences,
when the data satisfies WGARP but violates GARP. Note that, in our setup, convexity of
preferences is, in fact, a testable condition.

B. WARP
In this subsection, we provide a characterization of Samuelson’s (1938) weak axiom of
revealed preference (WARP).5 As discussed in Section 2.1, the strong axiom of revealed
preference (SARP) is the transitive counterpart to WARP as it allows for transitive
comparisons between bundles.6 Matzkin and Richter (1991) provides a complete characterization of SARP by showing that it is a necessary and sufficient condition for a data
set OT to be strictly rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave
utility function. Before stating their result, we define the notion of strict rationalization
as follows:
5

Recall from Section 2.1 that WARP holds if there is no pair of observations s, t ∈ T such that
x R,D xs and xs R,D xt , with xt 6= xs .
t

Recall that SARP holds if there is no pair of observations s, t ∈ T such that xt R xs and xs R,D xt ,
with xt 6= xs .
6
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Definition 1. (Strict utility rationalization) Consider a finite data set OT = {pt , xt }t∈T
and a utility function u : X 7→ R. For all y ∈ X and all t ∈ T such that pt y ≤ pt xt , the
data OT is strictly rationalized by u if u(xt ) > u(y) whenever y 6= xt .
Theorem B. (Matzkin and Richter 1991) Consider a finite data set OT = {pt , xt }t∈T .
The following statements are equivalent:
(i) The data OT can be strictly rationalized by a utility function.
(ii) The data OT satisfies SARP.
(iii) There exist numbers U t and λt > 0 for all t ∈ T such that the inequalities:




if xt 6= xs then, U t − U s > λt pt xt − xs ,
if xt = xs then, U t − U s = 0,
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
(iv) There exist numbers V t for all t ∈ T such that the inequalities:

if xt 6= xs and pt (xt − xs ) ≥ 0 then, V t − V s > 0,
if xt = xs then, V t − V s = 0,
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
(v) The data OT can be strictly rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing, and

strictly concave utility function.
Matzkin and Richter’s theorem is analogous to Afriat’s theorem in terms of strict rationalization. We note that the equivalence of statements (i) and (ii) is the content of
Houthakker’s theorem, since a utility function must represent a complete and transitive
preference relation. Moreover, their result shows that continuity, monotonicity, and strict
concavity are empirically nontestable properties.7
Next, we provide a complete revealed-preference characterization of WARP. This result
mirrors Matzkin and Richter’s theorem in terms of strict preference-function rationalization
(as opposed to strict utility rationalization). In this context, we define strict preference
function rationalization as follows:
7

Matzkin and Richter’s original formulation consists of statements (i), (ii), (iii), and (v). Talla Nobibon
et al. (2016) proves the equivalence of statements (ii) and (iv).
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Definition 2. (Strict preference-function rationalization) Consider a finite data set
OT = {pt , xt }t∈T and a preference function r : X × X 7→ R. For all y ∈ X and all t ∈ T
such that pt y ≤ pt xt , the data OT is strictly rationalized by r if r(xt , y) > 0 whenever
y 6= xt .
The next result contains our characterization:
Theorem A1. Consider a finite data set OT = {pt , xt }t∈T . The following statements are
equivalent:
(i) The data OT can be strictly rationalized by an asymmetric preference function.
(ii) The data OT satisfies WARP.
(iii) There exist numbers Rt,s and λtts > 0 for all t, s ∈ T with Rt,s = −Rs,t and λtts = λtst

such that inequalities:




if xt 6= xs then, Rt,s > λtts pt xt − xs ,
if xt = xs then, Rt,s = 0,
hold for all t, s ∈ T.
(iv) There exist numbers W t,s for all t, s ∈ T with W t,s = −W s,t such that inequalities:

if xt 6= xs and pt (xt − xs ) ≥ 0 then, W t,s > 0,
if xt = xs then, W t,s = 0,
hold for all t, s ∈ T.
(v) The data OT can be strictly rationalized by a coherent strict CMU preference func-

tion (which in particular satisfies asymmetry, continuity, monotonicity, and strict
piecewise concavity).
Analogous to our characterization of WGARP in Theorem 1, this result offers: (a)
a minimal strict rationalization of WARP on the basis of an ordinal property of the
preference function; (b) characterizations of WARP in terms of workable inequalities; and
(c) a cardinal representation in terms of a coherent CMU. This third part shows that
separate violations of continuity, monotonicity, and strict piecewise concavity cannot be
detected in finite data sets.

5

C. The Law of Demand and the Quasilinear Preference
Maximization Model
As described in Section 6.2 of the paper, we can impose restrictions on the piecemeal
utilities in the CMU preference function to provide a representation for choices obeying
the law of demand. This section derives necessary and sufficient conditions for a finite
data set to be rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing, skew-symmetric, concave,
and quasilinear preference function. Interestingly, we show that one such condition is
the law of demand, and consequently, this is equivalent to rationalization by a CMU
preference function with quasilinear piecemeal utilities. Before presenting these results, we
briefly recall the revealed-preference characterization for quasilinear-utility maximization.
Definition 3. (Quasilinear utility maximization) Consider a locally nonsatiated utility
function u(x). We say that a consumer facing prices p ∈ P and income w ∈ W is a
quasilinear utility maximizer if she solves
max u(x) + w − px ⇐⇒
x∈X

max u(x) + y s.t. px + y ≤ w.

x∈X,y∈R

As in standard applications of quasilinear utility maximization, we allow the numeraire
y to be negative in order to avoid technicalities related to corner solutions.8 Brown and
Calsamiglia (2007) shows that the axiom of cyclical monotonicity is a necessary and
sufficient condition for a data set to be rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing,
concave, and quasilinear utility function.
Axiom 1. (Cyclical monotonicity) Cyclical monotonicity holds if, for all distinct choices
of indices (1, 2, . . . , n) ∈ T:
p1 (x1 − x2 ) + p2 (x2 − x3 ) + · · · + pn (xn − x1 ) ≤ 0.
The next theorem recalls the revealed-preference characterization of quasilinear utility
maximization from Brown and Calsamiglia (2007) and Allen and Rehbeck (2018):
Theorem D. (Brown and Calsamiglia 2007; Allen and Rehbeck 2018) Consider a finite
data set OT = {pt , xt }t∈T . The following statements are equivalent:
8

Allen and Rehbeck (2018) shows the equivalence of the unconstrained quasilinear maximization and
the constrained version with a numeraire in Definition 3.
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(i) The data OT can be rationalized by a locally nonsatiated and quasilinear utility

function.
(ii) The data OT satisfies cyclical monotonicity.
(iii) There exist numbers U t for all t ∈ T such that the inequalities:

U t − U s ≥ pt (xt − xs ),
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
(iv) The data OT can be rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing, concave, and

quasilinear utility function.
Next, we state our main result in this section by giving a characterization of the law of
demand. The axiom of the law of demand is defined as:
Axiom 2. (Law of demand) The law of demand holds if, for all observations s, t ∈ T:
(pt − ps )(xt − xs ) ≤ 0.
For any sequence consisting of only two (distinct) observations s, t ∈ T, it is easy to
see that cyclical monotonicity and the law of demand are equivalent. We say that a CMU
preference function is a CMU quasilinear preference function if, for any u ∈ U , and any
U ∈ Ω the piecemeal utility function u is continuous, strictly increasing, concave, and
quasilinear. The next theorem shows that the law of demand is equivalent to rationalization
of a CMU quasilinear preference function:
Theorem B1. Consider a finite data set OT = {pt , xt }t∈T . The following statements are
equivalent:
(i) The data OT can be rationalized by a locally nonsatiated, skew-symmetric, and

quasilinear preference function.
(ii) The data OT satisfies the law of demand.
(iii) There exist numbers Rt,s , for all s, t ∈ T, with Rt,s = −Rs,t , such that inequalities:

Rt,s ≥ pt (xt − xs ),
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
7

(iv) The data OT can be rationalized by a coherent CMU quasilinear preference function.

The proof of Theorem B1 shows that continuity and strict monotonicity can be
imposed on the rationalizing quasilinear preference function in statement (i) without loss
of generality (i.e., these properties are separately nontestable).

Proofs of Section B: WARP
Proof of Theorem A1
As in the proof of our main result, we organize this proof in three blocks. First,
we prove the equivalence of WARP with the appropriate systems of inequalities. Next,
we prove the ordinal characterization of WARP. And finally, we provide the cardinal
representation of WARP by means of a coherent strict CMU preference function.
We begin with the equivalence of statements (ii), (iii), and (iv):
2
(ii) =⇒ (iii).– Suppose that WARP holds. For all s, t ∈ T, we let the data set Ost

consist of the two observations s, t ∈ T. Overall, this gives T 2 such data sets. By a
direct application of Matzkin and Richter’s (1991) theorem, the following conditions are
2
equivalent: (i) the data set Ost
satisfies WARP, (ii) there exist numbers Utsk and λkts > 0





for all k ∈ {t, s} such that the inequalities: if xk 6= xl then, Utsk − Utsl > λkts pk xk − xl ,
and if xk = xl then, Utsk − Utsl = 0 hold for all k, l ∈ {t, s}. Since permuting the data is
insignificant for Matzkin and Richter’s (1991) theorem, we can without loss of generality
set Utsk = Ustk and λkts = λkst for all k ∈ {t, s}. We obtain the inequalities in condition (iii)
by defining Rt,s = Utst − Utss and Rs,t = Utss − Utst .
(iii) =⇒ (iv).– Suppose that condition (iii) holds. If x 6= xt and pt (xt − xs ) ≥ 0 then
Rt,s > 0. We obtain condition (iv) by defining W t,s = Rt,s for all s, t ∈ T.
(iv) =⇒ (ii).– Suppose that condition (iv) holds, but that WARP is violated, i.e.,
pt (xt − xs ) ≥ 0 and ps (xs − xt ) ≥ 0 with xt 6= xs for some s, t ∈ T. Then W t,s > 0 and
W s,t > 0. Thus, (iv) is violated.
Next, we show the equivalence of statements (i) and (ii):
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(i) =⇒ (ii).– Let r(x, y) be an asymmetric preference function that strictly rationalizes
the data. Suppose there is a violation of WARP, so that pt xt ≥ pt xs and ps xs ≥ ps xt with
xs 6= xt for some pair of observations s, t ∈ T. Then, by strict rationalization in Definition
2, we have r(xt , xs ) > 0 and r(xs , xt ) > 0. But this violates asymmetry.
(ii) =⇒ (i).– Since this proof is very similar to the similar step in the proof of Theorem
1, we only give the main parts (and the parts that differ).
2
Suppose that WARP in condition (ii) holds. Consider the T 2 data sets Ots
for every
2
pair of observations s, t ∈ T. For the two observations in each data set Ost
, we define the

function ust : X → R as in Matzkin and Richter (1991). From this, we know that each
function ust is continuous, strictly concave and strictly increasing. Next, for all x, y ∈ X,
we define the mapping: rst : X × X → R as:
rst (x, y) =




ust (x) − ust (y)



pt (x − y) − ε(g(x − xt ) − g(y − xt )), if s = t.

if s 6= t,

for some small ε > 0 and where the function g is defined in Matzkin and Richter (1991).
Clearly, each function rs,t is continuous, strictly concave and skew-symmetric.
Define the preference function r(x, y) for any x, y ∈ X as:
r(x, y) = min max
λ∈∆ µ∈∆

= max min
µ∈∆ λ∈∆

XX

λs µt rst (x, y)

s∈T t∈T

XX

λs µt rst (x, y).

s∈T t∈T

First, we prove that the function r strictly rationalizes the data set OT . Consider y ∈ X
and some fixed t ∈ T such that xt 6= y and pt xt ≥ pt y. Let µt ∈ ∆ be such that µtj = 0 if
j 6= t and µtj = 1 if j = t. By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1, we have
r(xt , y) ≥ min
λ∈∆

= min
λ∈∆

XX

λi µtj rij (xt , y)

i∈T j∈T

X

λi rit (xt , y).

i∈T

It suffices to show that rit (xt , y) > 0 whenever xt 6= y and pt xt ≥ pt y for each data set
Oit2 . But this follows directly from the definition of rit and Matzkin and Richter’s (1991)
theorem. Hence, r(xt , y) > 0.
By the exact same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1, it can be shown that the
function r(x, y) is skew-symmetric, (and hence, asymmetric).
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And finally, we show the equivalence of statements (ii) and (v):
(v) =⇒ (ii).– Let r be a coherent CMU preference function that strictly rationalizes the
data. Suppose there is a violation of WARP, so that pt xt ≥ pt xs and ps xs ≥ ps xt for some
pair of distinct observations s, t ∈ T. Then, by strict rationalization in Definition 2, we
have r(xt , xs ) > 0 and r(xs , xt ) > 0. But this violates asymmetry (by Lemma 1).
(ii) =⇒ (v).– We only give the main parts (and the parts that differ from Theorem 1).
2
Suppose that WARP in condition (ii) holds. Consider the T 2 data sets Ots
for every
2
pair of observations s, t ∈ T. For the two observations in each data set Ost
, we define the

function ust : X → R as in Matzkin and Richter (1991), where each ust is continuous,
strictly concave, and strictly increasing.
Next, as in the proof of Theorem 1, we define Ut = ∪s∈T {uts } and ΩT = ∪t∈T Ut . Of
course, Ut and Ω are compact (finite and discrete). By the same arguments as in the
proof of Theorem 1, we have that ΩT satisfies coherency. Finally, we define the coherent
strict CMU preference function as:
r(x, y) = max min(u(x) − u(y)).
U ∈ΩT u∈U

Consider y ∈ X and some fixed t ∈ T such that pt xt ≥ pt y. We have:
r(xt , y) = max min(u(xt ) − u(y))
U ∈ΩT u∈U

≥ min(u(xt ) − u(y)).
u∈U

To show that our strict CMU function strictly rationalizes the data, i.e., r(xt , y) > 0, it
suffices to show that u(xt ) − u(y) > 0 whenever xt 6= y and pt xt ≥ pt y for each data set
Oit2 . But this follows directly from the definition of ΩT and Matzkin and Richter’s (1991)
theorem.
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Proofs of Section C: The Law of Demand and the Quasilinear
Preference Maximization Model
Proof Of Theorem D.
(i) =⇒ (ii).– By the definition of quasilinear rationalization, we have for any observation
s ∈ T with x = xs ,
u(xt ) − pt xt ≥ u(xs ) − pt xs .
Thus, after rearranging terms, for any sequence of distinct choices of indices (1, 2, 3, ..., n) ∈
T, we have:
p1 x2 − p1 x1 ≥ u(x2 ) − u(x1 ),
p2 x3 − p2 x2 ≥ u(x3 ) − u(x2 ),
..
.
pn x1 − pn xn ≥ u(x1 ) − u(xn ).

Adding up both sides, we get:
(p1 x2 − p1 x1 ) + (p2 x3 − p2 x2 ) + · · · + (pn x1 − pn xn )
≥ (u(x2 ) − u(x1 )) + (u(x3 ) − u(x2 )) + · · · + (u(x1 ) − u(xn ))
= 0.
Thus,
p1 (x1 − x2 ) + p2 (x2 − x3 ) + · · · + pn (xn − x1 ) ≤ 0,
which is cyclical monotonicity.
(ii) =⇒ (iii).– Suppose that condition (ii) holds and define:
Ut =

min

{1,2,3,...,n,t}∈T

{p1 (x2 − x1 ) + p2 (x3 − x2 ) + · · · + pn (xt − xn )},
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for all t ∈ T. That is, U t is a minimum of the given expression over all sequences starting
anywhere and terminating at t. Note that there are only finitely many sequences because
their elements are distinct. Hence, the minimum always exists. To show that the numbers
U t do satisfy the inequalities in statement (iii), suppose that:
U t = p1 (x2 − x1 ) + p2 (x3 − x2 ) + · · · + pn (xt − xn ),
U s = pa (xb − xa ) + pb (xc − xb ) + · · · + pm (xs − xm ),
for some distinct sequences {1, 2, 3, ...n, t} ∈ T and {a, b, c, ..., m, s} ∈ T. Then:
U t = p1 (x2 − x1 ) + p2 (x3 − x2 ) + · · · + pn (xt − xn )
≤ pa (xb − xa ) + pb (xc − xb ) + · · · + pm (xs − xm ) + ps (xt − xs )
= U s + ps (xt − xs ),
since the value on the left-hand side of the inequality is a minimum over all paths to t.
Hence,
U t ≤ U s + ps (xt − xs ),
for all s, t ∈ T, which are the inequalities in statement (iii).
(iii) =⇒ (iv).– Suppose that condition (iii) holds. For all x ∈ X, define the function:
u(x) = min{U s + ps (x − xs )}
s∈T

Since u is defined as the lower envelope of a set of linear functions, it is continuous, strictly
increasing and concave. Moreover, it is easy to show that u(xt ) = U t for all t ∈ T. Finally,
for all x ∈ X and all t ∈ T:
u(x) − pt x = min{U s + ps (x − xs )} − pt x
s∈T

≤ U t + pt (x − xt ) − pt x
= U t − p t xt
= u(xt ) − pt xt .
Thus, u rationalizes the data set OT .
(iv) =⇒ (i).– Trivial.
12

Proof of Theorem B1
(i) =⇒ (ii).– If the data set OT can be rationalized by a skew-symmetric and quasilinear
preference function, then for all t ∈ T and all y ∈ X,
r(xt , y) ≥ pt (xt − y).
In particular, it must be that for y = xs , r(xt , xs ) ≥ pt (xt − xs ). Analogously, we have
r(xs , xt ) ≥ ps (xs − xt ) for all s, t ∈ T. Adding these inequalities, and by skew-symmetry,
we have:
0 = r(xt , xs ) + r(xs , xt ) ≥ pt (xt − xs ) + ps (xs − xt ).
Rearranging terms, we get:
(pt − ps )(xt − xs ) ≤ 0,
for all s, t ∈ T, which is the law of demand.
(ii) =⇒ (iii).– Assume that condition (ii) holds and define:
1
Rs,t = (ps (xs − xt ) − pt (xt − xs )).
2
Clearly, Rs,t = −Rt,s for all s, t ∈ T. Moreover,
1
Rs,t = (ps (xs − xt ) − pt (xt − xs ))
2
1 s s
= (p (x − xt ) + pt (xs − xt ))
2
1 s s
= (p (x − xt ) − pt (xs − xt ) + 2pt (xs − xt )).
2
By condition (ii), we have
ps (xs − xt ) − pt (xs − xt ) = (ps − pt )(xs − xt ) ≤ 0.
Hence,
1
Rs,t = (ps (xs − xt ) − pt (xs − xt ) + 2pt (xs − xt )
2
1 s s
= (p (x − xt ) − pt (xs − xt )) + pt (xs − xt ) ⇐⇒
2
1
s,t
t s
t
R − p (x − x ) = (ps (xs − xt ) − pt (xs − xt ))
2

13

≤ 0,
implying:




−Rs,t ≥ −pt xs − xt ⇐⇒




Rt,s ≥ pt xt − xs ,
which are the inequalities in statement (iii).
(iii) =⇒ (i).– Suppose that condition (iii) holds and define for all x, y ∈ X the functions:




rst (x, y) = Rs,t + ps (x − xs ) − pt y − xt .
Clearly, the function rst is continuous, strictly increasing, concave in x, and convex in y.
Since Rs,t = −Rt,s , we have:




−rst (x, y) = − Rs,t + ps (x − xs ) − pt y − xt






= Rt,s + pt y − xt − ps (x − xs )
= rts (y, x) .
Let the T − 1 dimensional simplex be denoted ∆ = {λ ∈ RT+ |

PT

t=1

λt = 1}. Define the

preference function r(x, y) for any x, y ∈ X as:
r(x, y) = min max
λ∈∆ µ∈∆

XX

λs µt rst (x, y)

s∈T t∈T

= max min
µ∈∆ λ∈∆

XX

λs µt rst (x, y).

s∈T t∈T

We show that the function r is skew-symmetric, continuous, strictly increasing, and
concave. First, we show skew-symmetry:
−r(x, y) = − min max
λ∈∆ µ∈∆

= max min
λ∈∆ µ∈∆

= max min
λ∈∆ µ∈∆

XX

λs µt rst (x, y)

s∈T t∈T

XX

−λs µt rst (x, y)

s∈T t∈T

XX
s∈T t∈T

= r(y, x),
since −rst (x, y) = rts (y, x).
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−λs µt rts (y, x)

Second, we show that r is continuous. The simplex ∆ consists of a finite number of
elements and is therefore compact. Moreover, from above, we know that rst is continuous.
Hence, for any λ, µ ∈ ∆, the function
f (x, y; λ, µ) =

XX

λs µt rst (x, y),

s∈T t∈T

is continuous. By a direct application of Berge’s maximum theorem it follows that
r(x, y) = minλ∈∆ maxµ∈∆ f (x, y; λ, µ) is a continuous function of x, y ∈ X.
Third, we show that r is strictly increasing. Consider x, y, z ∈ X such that x > y.
Since each function rst is strictly increasing we have:
max
µ∈∆

XX

λt µs rst (x, z) > max
µ∈∆

s∈T t∈T

XX

λt µs rst (y, z),

s∈T t∈T

for all ∆. Hence,
min max
λ∈∆ µ∈∆

XX

λt µs rst (x, z) > min max
λ∈∆ µ∈∆

s∈T t∈T

XX

λt µs rst (y, z),

s∈T t∈T

which shows that r is strictly increasing in the first argument x.
Fourth, we show that r(x, y) is concave in x. Fix y and λ ∈ ∆, and consider the
function:
rλ (x) = max
µ∈∆

XX

λs µt rst (x, y) .

s∈T t∈T

We have:
rλ (x) = max
µ∈∆

= max
µ∈∆

XX

λs µt rst (x, y)

s∈T t∈T

XX





λs µt Rs,t + ps (x − xs ) − pt y − xt



s∈T t∈T



= max
µ∈∆

X

λs 

s∈T

X



µt Rs,t + µt ps (x − xs ) − µt pt y

t∈T



= max
µ∈∆

=

X
s∈T

X



− xt 

λs ps (x − xs ) +

s∈T

X



µt Rs,t − µt pt y



− xt 

t∈T

λs ps (x − xs ) + max
µ∈∆

XX



µt Rs,t − µt pt y − xt



.

s∈T t∈T

Clearly, rλ (x) is linear in x and, as such, concave. Hence, r (x, y) = minλ∈∆ rλ (x) is the
minimum over a set of linear functions and is therefore also concave.
Finally, we show that r is a quasilinear preference function that rationalizes the data.
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For all y ∈ X and all t ∈ T:


r xt , y



= min max
λ∈∆ µ∈∆

XX

≥ min
= min

X

λ∈∆



s∈T t∈T

XX

λ∈∆



λs µt rst xt , y


λs µtv rsv xt , y



s∈T v∈T





λs rst xt , y ,

t∈T

where µtv = 1 when v = t and zero otherwise. Note that the term pt (y − xt ) does not
depend on s, which implies:

r(xt , y) ≥ min
λ∈∆

= min
λ∈∆

=−

X



λs rst xt , y



s∈T

X









λs Rs,t + ps xt − xs − pt y − xt



s∈T

X





λs pt y − xt + min
λ∈∆

s∈T





= −pt y − xt + min
λ∈∆

X

X





λs Rs,t + ps xt − xs



s∈T





λs Rs,t + ps xt − xs



.

s∈T

Thus, r is a quasilinear preference function that rationalizes the data OT since:








r xt , y − pt xt − y = min
λ∈∆

X





λs Rs,t + ps xt − xs



s∈T

≥ 0,
because Rs,t + ps (xt − xs ) ≥ 0 by condition (iii) and λs ≥ 0 for all s, t ∈ T.
2
(iii) =⇒ (iv).– Consider the T 2 data sets Ots
for every pair of observations s, t ∈ T.
2
For any Ost
, condition (ii) implies that the law of demand holds, which, in turn, implies

that cyclical monotonicity holds (since the law of demand and cyclical monotonicity are
2
equivalent for Ost
). By directly applying Theorem D and Theorem 2.2 in Brown and
2
Calsamiglia (2007), we can construct piecemeal utility functions ust that rationalize Ost

and are continuous, strictly increasing, and quasilinear.
Using the piecemeal utilities ust , we construct a quasilinear CMU preference function,
r, as:
r(x, y) = max min(u(x) − u(y)).
U ∈ΩT u∈U

By the same arguments as in Theorem 1 we have that r rationalizes the data set OT .
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(iv) =⇒ (iii).– Consider the number:
r(xt , xs ) = max min(u(xt ) − u(xs )),
U ∈ΩT u∈U

where the utility functions u are continuous, strictly increasing, concave, and quasilinear.
The property of quasilinearity implies that we can without loss of generality impose the
restriction that the marginal utility of income is equal to unity (Brown and Calsamiglia
2007). Then, the piecemeal utility function, u, that solves the CMU maximization problem
is also quasilinear, where:
r(xt , xs ) = max min(u(xt ) − u(xs ))
U ∈ΩT u∈U

= u(xt ) − u(xs ).
By concavity of u, we have for any s, t ∈ T,
u(xt ) − u(xs ) ≥ pt (xt − xs ),
We get the inequalities in condition (iii) by defining the numbers Rts = u(xt ) − u(xs ).
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